


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
Mira ALWI

The Indonesian Quarterly is a medium for the views, research findings and evaluations of scholars, statesmen and creative thinkers in both national and international forum on Indonesia and other related issues, to promote better understanding of the current Indonesian situation and its problems.

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FROM THE EDITOR

At present the situation in the Asia-Pacific region seems to be uncertain. Nevertheless, says Jusuf Wanandi, an assesment on the future development of the region can be made based on certain new phenomena and trends observable today. Various ideas as how to build a stable international environment should also be considered in assessing the future course of that development in the 1980's. It has to be admitted, however, that unanticipated developments could still occur on account of the suddenness of change in the region.

It is an undeniable fact that there is a rising demand for higher education in Southeast Asia in general and in Indonesia in particular. Consequently the number of Institutions for Higher Education with their increasing differentiation, if not proliferation, is becoming larger. The number of student enrollment has also been increasing.

On the other hand, argues Harsja Bachtiar in his paper, in the endeavor to meet the demand, higher education in these countries is also facing severe limitations, constraints and one of the most serious is the shortage of adequately trained academic personnel. This means that Indonesia and other Southeast Asian countries are in very unfavorable position vis-a-vis the more educationally developed countries. Therefore, efforts should be made to meet the tremendous needs for genuine higher education in the Southeast Asian region.

One of the means to improve the Indonesian educational system is to find better technologies of education. According to Wayan Seregeg, a child-centered approach to Biology education in primary schools will most likely promote the educational system and this will in turn be a relevant contribution to the national development.

Parsudi Suparlan tries to highlight ethnic groups of Indonesia by describing Indonesian ethnic groups and their problems. This description involves some theoretic-al and methodological issues in areas where ethnic groups might play significant roles. Parsudi also intends to show that studies on ethnic groups and related subjects, which were considered a sensitive matter in Indonesia, should not necessarily produce sensitive or emotional matters. Similar to any scientific discussion, this depends on the conceptual and theoretical frameworks used.

In his article, Professor Rasheeduddin Khan from Jawaharlal Nehru University, tried to shed light on the relevance, challenges and dimension of non-alignment today. He stated that the major battle of the non-aligned today is not much political and diplomatic, but developmental and technological. Creative fusion of internal stability and change and international peace and security is pre-requisite in order to move from the level of active cooperation among themselves and with countries and

states that agree with the goals and purposes of the non-alignment movement, in order to attain a more just and equitable and humane world order.

Danny Zacharias aims to illustrate the consequences that may arise on account of developmental programs entering the village through the Village Head (Lurah) as the sole entrance. In the analysis Danny points out how development program mechanism enters the village and how the Village Head strives for himself and his family to enjoy the greatest benefit of the development program's purpose.

THE WESTERN PACIFIC IN THE 1980'S: AN ANALYSIS

Jusuf WANANDI

INTRODUCTION

Although the situation in the Western Pacific (Asia-Pacific) region remains uncertain at present, several recent developments do provide a basis for analysing the directions and dimensions of change in the region. This article attempts to evaluate the course of development in the Western Pacific region for the coming decade, that is, the 1980's. The author feels that certain indicators and trends observable today can provide valuable insights for studying the future of the region. Due to the suddenness of change in the region, however, unanticipated developments could still occur.

Within the dynamics of the Western Pacific region, there are several new phenomena that can serve as the starting point for analysis. The most important of these concerns the role of international economics in the region, including both the economic relations between industrialized countries and developing countries and those between the Northern and the Southern parts of the Western Pacific region. The economic role to be played by the Peoples Republic of China must also be included in this assessment, as well as the role and influence of ASEAN as an organization for regional cooperation. One of the major problems is to what extent the policies instituted by the individual Western Pacific countries will produce unstable economic relations in the area, rather than creating a cooperative framework that will contribute to regional stability and peace. The Western Pacific region is currently undergoing the fastest and most dynamic development of any region in the world. This development can be seen not only in the economic growth rates of the individual countries in the region, but also in the expansion of trade relations between the countries.

The second new phenomenon concerns the domestic situation in the various countries of the Western Pacific, especially in the region's developing countries. The key issue here is the rate and scope of change in

society and in its values as a logical outgrowth of the process of development and modernization. In addition, several other essential tasks confront these countries. These include the problem of the continuity and transfer of leadership in political environments where social and political institutions are not yet firmly established and regularized, as well as the problem of creating national unity in the face of minority identifications of various kinds (ethnic minorities, religious minorities, and the like). All these issues will influence the course of development in the Western Pacific region. Throughout the decade of the 1970's, the above-mentioned problems did not receive the utmost attention. But after the recent experience in Iran, it becomes more concrete and more obvious that domestic upheaval has the potential to produce turbulence in international relations as well, and that this effort can be enormous.

The third new phenomenon concerns the appearance of new alliances, which could help promote regional stability in the 1980's but which can not eliminate the possibility that new antagonisms will develop bringing new instability to the region. With the United States partnership with Japan and China constituting one "camp", and the Soviet Union representing the other, the potential for instability certainly exists, especially if the Soviet Union feels encircled or surrounded. Faced with such a situation, the Soviet Union could respond in several ways, for example: (a) by increasing its military strength, or (b) by creating new alliances with other countries in the Pacific region. This latter option has already been employed by the Soviet Union in its relations with Vietnam, through which the Soviet Union is attempting to maintain and increase its influence in the Pacific region. Its close relationship with Vietnam gives the Soviet Union the opportunity to put military pressure on the surrounding area, to threaten the transportation lines so logistically vital to countries like Japan, and to attempt to neutralize the strength and influence of the US Seventh Fleet.

At present the United States is taking a cautious approach, attempting to make certain that its new relationship with China is not seen as an alliance created to oppose the Soviet Union. Apparently the Soviet Union is proving difficult to convince on this point. For the countries of ASEAN, this new development raises the key question: Where and in what capacity is ASEAN to play a part in the various alliance possibilities that will emerge in the years ahead. According to the group's principles, it is already clear that ASEAN will attempt to avoid being drawn into the conflicts that might arise between the Great Powers in the region. One of the problems that must be recognized, however, is that whenever we speak of economic relations, ASEAN automatically has a much larger and more important relationship with the United States and Japan than it has with

the Soviet Union. The feeling can not be avoided, therefore, that ASEAN has a natural tendency to lean toward the three-way alliance mentioned above.

The fourth new phenomenon is the increasing complexity in the relations among nations. It is becoming more and more apparent that international relations can no longer be understood solely in terms of security considerations, as was the case in the 1960's. Nowadays security is increasingly viewed as being related to social and economic considerations, and even to cultural attitudes and values. In spite of this, the importance of security considerations in contemporary international development should not be underestimated, because in the final analysis security remains the basic factor in creating a set of relationships that make regional stability and development possible.

It can not be denied that orderly political and economic development can only be achieved where there is a strong foundation, which requires security. As far as regional security is concerned, even though the differences between the Soviet Union and China, between Vietnam and China, and between Vietnam and Cambodia have become increasingly pronounced the overall situation remains as yet unclear and not as well defined as the security situation in the European theatre. The most important difference lies in the uncertainty of the alignments that confront one another in the Western Pacific region. The overall regional situation is thus extremely difficult to analyze because the military configurating is not well established, as it is in Europe, and because regional developments occur so rapidly, especially in the wake of the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia. In such an uncertain environment, the most important thing is to prevent each new situation that occurs from developing into a major crisis.

Another factor adding to the complexity of international relations in the Western Pacific is the fact that the United States is no longer the only Great Power in the region, either in military/security terms or in economic terms. In the military field, the position of the United States has been balanced by the strength of the Soviet Union, while in the economic field the United States has been balanced by Japan and by the new Asian economic powers, that is, by Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong, and the growth of ASEAN as a potential economic power.

I. DANGERS AND UNCERTAINTIES FACING THE WESTERN PACIFIC IN THE 1980'S

The most important single cause of uncertainty in the region is the Sino-Soviet conflict, and the various threats to peace and stability that the

conflict generates. This conflict shows no sign of being resolved in the next several years, and in fact seems at present to be escalating in intensity, perhaps toward new heights of explosiveness. The Sino-Soviet conflict is the result of many factors, and has been gradually expanding toward open conflict in Southeast Asia.

The Sino-Soviet conflict cannot be separated from the conflict between Vietnam and Cambodia, in which Vietnam is supported by the Soviet Union and Cambodia is supported by China. In addition to its historical motivations, that is, the uniting of all of Indochina under Vietnamese domination, and armed with an official agreement with the Soviet Union (since November 1978), Vietnam apparently felt the time had arrived to settle the Cambodia problem permanently and put a stop to the continuing disturbances along their mutual border. At the same time, Chinese support was given to Cambodia because the leaders in Peking felt that Vietnam had already entered into the Soviet sphere of influence and was acting as part of Moscow's grand design to encircle China. Because of these balance of power considerations, and because of the Vietnamese treatment of overseas Chinese, China applied more pressure to Vietnam by increasing its aid to Cambodia, even though China did not always feel comfortable with the policies of the Pol Pot regime.

The Chinese invasion of Vietnam, following as it did on the heels of the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, was intended, among other things, to keep China from losing face and to demonstrate that China is a regional power not to be ignored. In addition, China also believed that Vietnam had to be taught a lesson so that it would not become the Cuba of the region, rampaging at will in the future. According to the Chinese view, Cuba can act aggressively now because the United States passed up the opportunity to punish it severely in 1962. With its invasion of Vietnam, China perhaps also intended to prevent Vietnam from granting bases to the Soviet Union for use in facilitating the encirclement of China in the future. Within this framework, the Chinese invasion can be seen as primarily a political move. The important question now is to what extent the Chinese action will push the Vietnamese into becoming more dependent on the Soviet Union.

The second issue creating uncertainty is the response of the Soviet Union to these new developments. A crucial point to be considered is whether the Soviet Union now feels it has suffered a loss of face. It is clear that the Soviets were not going to permit the Chinese invasion to continue indefinitely and move farther and farther into Vietnamese territory, especially if Hanoi were threatened with attack. The Soviet Union was indeed placed in a difficult situation because of its treaty with Vietnam, but it still had several definite options available. The Soviet Union

could maintain and increase its military aid and send military advisors, along with providing reconnaissance from its offshore fleet as well as from the air. The Soviets could also assist Vietnam by pressuring China along the Sino-Soviet border. This could be accomplished by provoking border incidents, perhaps along the Usuri River (as occurred in 1969), or even by occupying or bombing Chinese industrial centers, nuclear power centers such as Lop Nor (in Sinkiang), or petroleum production centers such as Taching (in Manchuria). These attacks could also be increased in scope. Apparently, however, the Soviet Union has been very cautious in selecting its responses. And through its policy of self-restraint, the Soviet Union has allowed international opinion to develop in such a way that China is viewed as the aggressor. Thus, the international opinion that had resulted in Vietnam's isolation will now be balanced because of China's recent actions.

Given present international realities, the most important goal for the countries of the region is probably that the Soviet Union does not feel the need to get heavily and directly involved in the Vietnam-China conflict. Such strong Soviet participation would automatically include Soviet demands for the use of Vietnamese naval bases, such as Cam Ranh and Bien Hoa, which Vietnam would find difficult to refuse. If this takes place, then the dominant position of the United States, with its Seventh Fleet and its bases at Subic and Clark Field, would be neutralized by the Soviet Union. In other words, the Soviet Union would go from being a second-class to a first-class power in Southeast Asia. This change would make it more possible for the Soviets to put pressure on the countries of Southeast Asia and would give a boost to revolutionary opposition forces within those countries. In addition, by disrupting the logistical and commercial lifelines of the West and Japan, the Soviet Union could use its military power to create concrete political advantages in Southeast Asia with greater success than has heretofore been possible.

Based on such an evaluation, ASEAN has adopted a neutral attitude, with regard to both the conflict between Vietnam and Cambodia and the conflict between China and Vietnam. ASEAN's neutrality is intended to reduce the involvement of Great Powers in the region. On the one hand, this neutral stance seeks to prevent Vietnam from feeling cornered, which could drive it further into the Soviet sphere of influence and thus enlarge the presence of the Soviet Union in Southeast Asia. On the other hand, there is anxiety as to China's intentions, especially its long-range intentions, which as yet remain unclear and indefinite. Thus the best course for ASEAN is seen as trying to limit the involvement of China in the region.

Apart from the goal of limiting the involvement of the conflicting Great Powers, ASEAN is also attempting to prevent the rise of other

problems that might prove difficult to resolve in the future. Many problems faced by ASEAN regarding Vietnam must be resolved soon, so that the future stability of the region is not disrupted; among these are problems of Vietnamese refugees and the problem of demarcating exact and mutually acceptable borders. In conducting its relations with Vietnam, ASEAN still has hope that the nationalistic spirit remains strong in Vietnam, and that Vietnam will not choose to be dependent on anyone, including the Soviet Union, unless it is forced to do so.

The third problem in the Western Pacific region concerns the long-term conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union. The conflict between these two countries is basically one of global proportions, but because of this global character, each moment of the conflict can be contested in different areas, with results that do not necessarily contribute to regional efforts to maintain stability.

As for the future, it is becoming increasingly difficult to separate events in the Western Pacific region from the global conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States. One of the reasons for this is the presence of China. Like it or not, in its dealings with China the United States must always take the Soviet Union into account. And any agreement achieved in the SALT II negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States will also depend heavily on developments in the relationship between the United States and China. Because of complications such as these, the United States finds itself in a position where it must try in every circumstance to maintain a balance, not only in its own perceptions, but also in the perceptions of the Soviet Union, China, and other countries as well. Preserving this balance in concrete policy terms, is not an easy task for the United States, as evidenced by the controversies concerning the American embargo on weapons sales to both the Soviet Union and China.

With regard to Soviet perceptions of this three-way relationship, Moscow may claim in the future that Chinese nuclear weapons should be considered as part of the American strategic arsenal. This question of military equilibrium is also important from other perspectives. What, for example, is the meaning of the expansion of the Soviet Union's Pacific Fleet? If war were to break out in Europe, requiring a portion of Soviet land and air power to be redeployed from the Chinese border to the European front, then the Soviet Pacific Fleet could perhaps compensate for this troop reduction. Operationally, the Soviet Pacific Fleet is not directed against the American strategic submarines force (SLBM), and perhaps is not intended to directly challenge the American Seventh Fleet, but it could well play an important political role in the area. This poli-

tical role could take the form of putting pressure on the countries of the Western Pacific, including Japan.

The fourth problem area concerns the uncertainty of China's future policies in the area. The normalization of relations between China and the United States and the treaty of peace and friendship between China and Japan, the effects of which remain unclear, are seen as a gamble on the side of the United States and Japan, affecting the Western Pacific region as a whole. The uncertainty concerning China stems for the most part from the dynamics of developments within China itself. The direction of China's internal development is not yet assured, and in the past there have been several drastic changes in China's overall orientation, from radicalism to a more moderate position, followed by a return to radicalism. The position of Deng Xiaoping and his supporters, that is, the group responsible for the current moderate policy line, appears to be secure at present, but the key question of succession remains. The generation that will assume positions of leadership in the future received an education that was dominated by the thought of Mao Zedong and has never had close connections with the outside world. Because this political group grew out of the Cultural Revolution, there is a chance they will not easily accept policy guidelines that they feel are too far removed from the policy guidelines set down by Mao. Another source of uncertainty concerns the ability of Deng Xiaoping to institute his modernization program given the limited capabilities of the present Chinese economy. The scarcity of skilled labor, effective financial institutions, and physical infrastructure will definitely limit the capacity of the Chinese economy to absorb imported capital and technology. At the same time, China's ability to finance its imports and pay back its foreign debts also remains uncertain.

Assuming the modernization program itself can be carried out, there is still the danger that if modernization proceeds too rapidly, it will bring a new set of problems in its wake. With such a large and diverse population, China requires a modernization process that will maintain harmony and equilibrium among the various groups in Chinese society, with the benefits of growth well distributed among them. The modernization program now being pushed calls for the importing of all kinds of goods from abroad, from Coca Cola to satellites, which could tend to cause disequilibrium within Chinese society.

The current foreign policy of China is quite straight forward, that is, directed totally against the Soviet Union and toward achieving its domestic modernization goals. These foreign policy guidelines have already moved China into a closer relationship with the West. The crucial point here is to what extent China is willing to follow a moderate path in its foreign policy, in terms of maintaining open and friendly relations

with the West. Within China itself, there are still pro Soviet political groups that would like to improve China's relations with the Soviet Union, and there are also groups that find it difficult to accept too close a relationship with the capitalist West. If in the future the Soviet Union puts more pressure on China than it can withstand, there is a possibility that China's foreign policy would be forced toward a return to some sort of accommodation or partnership with the Soviet Union. Such a change in China's overall foreign policy orientation would have widespread implications throughout the Western Pacific region, especially if the two communist powers worked together to consolidate the region under their sphere of influence. The possibility of such a development in the Western Pacific is one important reason for the United States and Japan to try to strengthen the domestic position of Deng Xiaoping, so that the moderate policies instituted by Deng will be continued by his successors. But this policy carries large risks as well. For if China does in fact change its foreign policy direction in the future, it will constitute a much stronger force that at present, economically and technologically as well as militarily, as a result of its period of close relations with the West.

Another problem that remains uncertain concerns the status of Taiwan and the other contested areas claimed by China (Chinese irredentism). At present it is not yet clear whether China will employ peaceful means or force in its efforts to resolve these issues. As can be seen from the Chinese stand on the Paracel Islands issue, and from its recent invasion of Vietnam, it is clear that China will not hesitate to employ force if it so decides. The Chinese invasion of Vietnam should demonstrate to the United States that the security of Taiwan requires a meaningful American commitment, not only economically but, more important, militarily. That the region still contains several potential border disputes is also a factor that must be taken into account.

The fifth area of regional uncertainty concerns the role that Japan will play in the future of the region. The key issues here are (a) changes in Japanese public opinion on matters of defense and security; and (b) the role of the Japanese self-defense forces in dealing with future threats to Japan's security. In the past, to speak of Japanese defense and security was to speak of Japan's defense treaty with the United States. Japan's self-defense forces did not play a significant role, and the defense budget was restricted to less than 1% of GNP. Presently, however, Japanese public opinion on military matters has changed measurably. The self-defense force is now seen as playing an important part in Japan's security, and there is widespread sentiment that its military capabilities should be upgraded by increasing its size and the level of its armaments. At the same time, the credibility of Japan's security treaty with the United States is being increasingly called into question, although direct criticism of the trea-

ty itself has thus far come only from the communist party. The government and people of Japan have also begun openly to identify the Soviet Union as a legitimate threat, as can be seen since the publication of the White Paper on Japanese Security in 1976.

The sixth source of uncertainty in the region is the Korean problem, and most importantly, the changing distribution of power, both economic and military, from the North to the South in the 1980's. In the past, the North had enjoyed a superiority of strength over the South, which had developed at a slower initial rate. The relative decline of North Korea in its competition with the South raises the possibility that Pyongyang could increase its provocations against the South or even attempt to destroy the dominant position of the South through a direct military invasion.

Viewed in this light, President Carter's earlier decision to withdraw forces from South Korea, a decision made unilaterally without prior consultation, must be considered a very serious policy error. Such a move could create the impression in North Korea, that an invasion of the South could be carried out successfully in the near future because the credibility of the American presence and American guarantees could not be relied upon. The implications of Carter's decision were felt not only in Korea but have also created uncertainty about the role of the United States throughout the Western Pacific region.

For the present at least, North Korea has not received support from either the Soviet Union or China for carrying out an invasion of the South. The political balance among the three Great Powers, the United States, the Soviet Union, and China, is severely tested in Korea. By establishing diplomatic relations with China, President Carter hopes that China will pressure Kim Il Sung against carrying out an invasion of the South. China can not advocate such a policy, too openly, however, because of the danger that North Korea would then be pushed into a closer relationship with the Soviet Union.

Currently, the military strength of North Korea, in air as well as sea power, is still superior to that of South Korea, but it is estimated that within five years time an effective balance can be achieved if South Korea carries out adequate preparations. Economic development in the South is proceeding much more rapidly than in the North, but the majority of South Korea's industrial centers are still located close to the border, which makes them vulnerable to an attack from the North.

That the withdrawal of American ground forces from Korea was a premature step, one that could have led to misunderstanding and tension in the area, was eventually understood by President Carter, who has since decided to postpone the withdrawal. In principle it is definite that the

withdrawal will eventually take place, but, unlike before, no definite timetable has been set.

For the moment, the efforts undertaken by President Park Chung Hee to initiate a new approach toward North Korea represent, only the first steps of a process that will inevitably proceed very slowly. The status quo will probably have to be maintained at least so long as the situation in North Korea remains so full of uncertainties. A problem that North Korea must soon face is the transfer of power, since the health of Kim Il Sung is already declining; and there are many who feel that an attempt to reunify Korea by force could still occur within his lifetime.

The seventh source of uncertainty concerns the economic relations among the countries of the Western Pacific region. The problems to be faced here are actually a function of the degree of strength and steadiness achieved in the construction of regional economic, financial, and trade institutions. This is in turn closely related to the present tendencies toward protectionism between the United States, on the one hand, and Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea, on the other. If the problems of harmonizing international economic relations are not soon overcome, then the future will certainly see serious economic disturbances that will also affect the political relations and the stability of the region.

This could also occur if the issues discussed within the framework of the North-South dialogue allowed to drag on unresolved, with the developing countries eventually being pushed toward more radical positions. All of these issues ultimately depend on the domestic economic policies of the industrialized countries and on the attitude of their citizens toward the necessity of carrying out basic structural changes in their economies. Domestic economic problems can not be resolved "artificially" through the use of protective tariffs and non-tariff trade barriers. This holds true for the United States and Japan, and for Australia as well.

Another problem concerns the economic role of China in the region. For example, in their efforts to assist in China's development, will the industrialized countries, such as the United States and Japan, switch the direction of their technology and capital transfers from other developing countries to China? The form of China's economic participation in the Western Pacific is not yet clear, especially its economic relations with the developing countries of the region. How will the competition that will inevitably arise be kept within safe limits? In addition, some coordination of relations between the countries of ASEAN and those countries already well-advanced along the developmental path, such as South Korea, Taiwan, and Hong Kong, needs to be considered. This will ultimately depend, however, on the extent to which ASEAN can fulfill its developmental potential and so be able to play a meaningful role in the econ-

omic coordination, and economic cooperation, of the Western Pacific region.

Still another area of uncertainty concerns the domestic circumstances of the developing countries in the region and the effects that domestic events can have on the relations between nations. It is true that this issue has not received enough attention in the past, but it has been brought dramatically to the forefront by recent events in Iran. The important consideration here is how to effectively coordinate programs for economic development and modernization in societies that have not yet established stable social and political institutions. It is also true that there is no definite means to ensure harmony between traditional cultural values and the various destabilizing influences that inevitably accompany the modernization process. In addition, progress in economic development also tends to create the problem of rising expectations on the part of the population. These expectations are not only difficult to satisfy but also contribute to a widening economic gap and an imbalance in the distribution of the benefits of development. Popular aspirations that arise are difficult to articulate in a regularized manner because of the lack of effective mechanism for mass political participation; popular dissatisfaction can thus lead to a united anti-government political force. A combination of these factors, especially where the government is oppressive, tends to incite middle class opposition which could explode at any time.

Uncertainty is also created by the problem of leadership succession within the various countries of the region, almost all of which lack established mechanisms and institutions for changing the national leadership without generating severe instability. Such instability can have very important and far-reaching consequences, including a weakening of the political system and oftentimes even the destruction of the existing social order, which in turn affects the entire region.

Another internal political problem that needs to be resolved is that of national unity and the role of the minority groups within that unity. The problems of regionalism, communalism, and religion still tend to create political and social tensions, and constitute a serious domestic problem for the countries of the Western Pacific region. Change is not in itself a negative factor, but it must proceed with a certain continuity. Stable relations between countries can not be guaranteed by relations among officials only, for such relations are always subject to change, but must be based on something stronger, that is, on relations involving all elements of society.

II. THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE WESTERN PACIFIC

The United States requires special attention in our analysis since it is the only Great Power capable of strategically balancing the role of the Communist Great Powers in the region. At the moment, however, the United States is itself indefinite as to its actual role in the Western Pacific region. This is the result of several constraining factors, the first of which is the domestic political situation in the United States. As can be seen in the general outlook of the American people, also reflected in the Congress, the orientation of United States foreign policy is still centered on Europe. This is because European culture and the European systems of government are well-known in the United States, and the general outlook of the Europeans is easily understood by Americans. In addition, the national trauma resulting from the American involvement in Vietnam has increasingly led the United States to focus its attention on Europe, even though this may not be warranted by current economic realities. In the field of trade, for example, the Western Pacific region has already become more important than Europe to the United States, although American investment in Europe is approximately three times as high as in the Western Pacific region.

The American trauma over Vietnam is now gradually being overcome, but a clear picture as to the new role of the United States in the region has yet to emerge. Within the Congress, for example, there has been a reemergence of interest in the Asia Pacific region and a general recognition that the region can not be ignored. One of the reasons for this revival of interest is the global political rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union, within which the Asia Pacific region possesses great significance. The Asia Pacific region constitutes a crucial arena of Great Power rivalry, and the alignments and developments in the region are still far from settled. The uncertain situation of the region stems in part from the changing position of the United States within it. Whereas the United States formerly occupied a position of clear superiority in the region, especially in the security and military fields, that position has now been effectively balanced by the power of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union currently deploys one-third of its entire military fleet in the Pacific Ocean, and deploys one-fourth of its ground forces in the Asia Pacific region.

In addition to this changing balance of power in the Asia Pacific region, there is also the difficulty of long-range policy planning in the United States. The problem is that the formulation of policy is always influenced by the general elections that take place every two years, in the case of the Congress, and every four years, in the case of the President, who himself is limited to a maximum of two terms. As a result, it is often difficult to achieve continuity in national policies. Due to the above

obstacles, there is at present no comprehensive American policy toward the Asia Pacific region. Such a policy would not have to take the form of a single doctrine applied universally throughout the entire region, for each country in the region contains its own special set of circumstances, but the policies undertaken by the United States should, at the least, not conflict with one another.

In addition to these problems, the United States now faces a more complex international situation in which its attention is often divided among many issues and locales simultaneously. Because of this, Congressional as well as public opinion can only be truly focused on the most critical of situations. The conclusion can be drawn that the most important obstacle to formulating comprehensive long-range policies is the lack of sufficient support from the Congress and the American people. The current Administration has itself begun to realize the importance of formulating such comprehensive policies and actually has the opportunity to develop them now, since the United States is not presently involved in any wars or major conflicts. The current international situation is perceived as favourable, with the two great communist powers in conflict with one another, diplomatic relations with China already established, and relations with Japan returning to their normal steady course. In some circles it is felt that the Administration has not paid enough attention to the fact that the current expansion of Soviet military strength is actually, the result of policies initiated by the Kremlin several years ago. In the perceptions of many observers in the Western Pacific region (and in Europe as well), the relative military strength of the United States has indeed declined. Perceptions such as these contribute to uncertainty. And this uncertainty is increased when one considers the difficulties encountered by the Administration in formulating and implementing policies while faced with a Congress that is not always cooperative. The controversy over the withdrawal of American forces from South Korea is a case in point.

On the other hand, certain important problems have been resolved satisfactorily, for example the controversy over the American bases at Subic Bay and Clark Field. But the United States still needs to restore the credibility of its commitments, and regain the trust of its friends. In this regard, the case of Taiwan will provide a crucial test.

Other issues vital to the Asia Pacific region will also test the credibility of the United States. For example, will the United States continue to postpone the removal of its ground forces from South Korea in the absence of a definite timetable for withdrawal? And what will result from the resolutions in Congress concerning compensation for the use of mili-

tary bases in the Philippines, along with guaranteed sales of needed weapons to the non-communist countries of East and Southeast Asia?

American policy in the Asia Pacific region in the 1980's will depend on many factors, as we have discussed, but in theory at least the United States is not totally constrained as to possible courses of action. Robert Scalapino has suggested that the United States possesses three main options.¹ The first option is a policy of "limited involvement", in which the United States would play an active role in the Asia Pacific region economically and culturally, and also politically, but would pull back to Hawaii in terms of its involvement in the security affairs of the region. The American military presence in the region would be limited to those weapons with a distinct capacity for "power projection", such as its strategic submarines (SLBM's). The United States' second option might be termed a "united front" strategy, in which the United States would join with Japan, China, and other countries, to form a de facto bloc facing the Soviet Union. The third option is a policy of "maintaining an equilibrium", which would not differ greatly from current American policy in the region. That is, it would have the American relationship with Japan as its cornerstone, and would feature a policy of balance, or even-handedness, in American relations with the Soviet Union and China. Within this third policy option, the Soviet Union would have the acknowledged right to maintain a genuine presence in the Asia Pacific region, the goal being to create a balance among the great powers and thus guarantee the stability of the region.

Evaluating the above options, it is clear that the first one, that of "limited involvement", would be difficult to implement effectively, since any American military pull-back from the region would further erode the credibility of the United States, at a time when American credibility is vital for dealing with the growing Soviet military strength in the Asia Pacific region. Only the United States is capable of balancing this Soviet military strength. In the absence of an American military presence, the American economic, cultural, and political role in the region would eventually decline as well, for the United States would be viewed by the countries of the region as an unreliable partner.

The second policy option, that of the "united front", would also prove difficult to implement effectively, because of the danger that the Soviet Union would feel itself cornered and would respond with adventuristic acts directed against the countries making up the "front". This policy is also unsatisfactory when viewed from the ASEAN perspective, primarily

1 See Robert A. Scalapino, "Approaches To Peace and Security In Asia: The Uncertainty Surrounding American Strategic Principles", *Current Scene*, August-September 1978.

because of the role China would play. China's long-range outlook and ambitions, remain unclear, and as its recent invasion of Vietnam has demonstrated, China has no desire to restrict its actions or to rule out the use of force. Thus, despite China's statements that it will focus its attention on development and modernization, in actuality China is not reluctant to carry out aggressive policies, even though these policies would appear to endanger China's campaign to develop and modernize as rapidly as possible. In the long term, a China that is strong and modern, but which adopts an aggressive political orientation, would constitute a serious threat to the countries of ASEAN. And in the short term, there are several boundary disputes that could also be a source of conflict between China and its neighbors. That China may resort to military force to resolve these disputes is a possibility that can not be ruled out or ignored. For all these reasons, there would of course be hesitation on ASEAN's part about inviting China into a united front. If this united front were indeed to come about, an implicit part of such a policy would be that China would have to be strengthened militarily, in order to face an extremely powerful Soviet Union. On the basis of these considerations, including ASEAN's apprehensions about China's role in the region, it may be that the best overall choice for the United States is one that combines various aspects of the above policy options. Such a policy would have as its foundation a close coalition between the United States and its traditional friends, especially Japan, Australia, and New Zealand, and would work to maintain the balance in the Western Pacific region. Within this framework, China would not be a military partner, but China's actual relationship with the coalition would depend ultimately on the policies adopted by the Soviet Union.

In greater detail, the above policy framework would include:

- a. Balanced relationships within the US-Soviet-China triangle, with relations between the United States and China limited to the economic and cultural spheres, and not involving military cooperation;
- b. Close relations between the United States and Japan, because Japan is at once a great economic power and the most important strategically of the United States in the region. It is essential, therefore, that the present difficulties in the economic and trade relations of the two countries be overcome, and that Japan receives the opportunity to play a role in the security affairs of the region. It is true that there are still several constraints on Japanese activity in the security field, but because the trend toward a greater Japanese role is already evident, and has support within Japan itself, it would be beneficial if the United States participates in giving a positive direction to that trend. To this end, the two countries need to create a smooth and stable mechanism

for carrying on regular bilateral dialogue and consultation on issues of mutual importance;

- c. Relations with South Korea that serve to safeguard American credibility, not only in the eyes of the South Koreans themselves but throughout the region. This is vital because a further decline in US credibility would create severe uncertainty among American's friends and generate misperceptions among its adversaries. Meanwhile, it is hoped that China will exert influence on North Korea to finally accept the reality of South Korea's existence;
- d. An American relationship with ASEAN encompassing both an economic and a security dimension. Economic relations can be expanded in the private sector, but the role of the US government in this process is very important as well, especially in providing guarantees. In the security field, the United States must coordinate its policies with the Philippines in order to maintain the use of its bases there, for these bases serve as an important symbol of the American presence in South-east Asia and thus contribute to the security of the region. In addition, the United States needs to guarantee the continuation of arms sales to the countries of ASEAN;
- e. Maintaining the US commitment to ANZUS (its alliance with Australia and New Zealand) and the Southern Pacific region generally, to deter any Soviet adventurism in the area;
- f. A flexible American relationship with Indochina, especially Vietnam. It is true that at present, the normalization of relations between the two countries is constrained by many factors, especially the recent Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, but these relations are essential so that Vietnam is not totally isolated within the Soviet sphere of influence. Improved relations are also important so that Vietnam does not feel compelled into granting military bases to the Soviets. The possibilities for establishing constructive relations with Vietnam must not be closed off by the United States, because sooner or later Vietnam will be forced to open itself to the West again in order to promote its economic development;
- g. An active American role in creating workable international institutions that can overcome current tensions within the international economy, especially trade issues and North-South relations generally. The Western Pacific is presently the most dynamic growth area in the world, but it is for precisely this reason that coordinated policies are required, so that serious international economic disputes do not arise. And even though China will also play a role in this regional system of economic relations, it is essential that Peking's participation not come at the expense of ASEAN;

- h. A mutually beneficial relationship between the United States and the developing countries of the region, with the United States demonstrating sufficient understanding as to their internal conditions and their problems. The domestic political situation in the developing countries tends to reflect the rapid changes that are taking place in their societies, and a certain amount of instability is therefore unavoidable. In such circumstances, the United States can not force the universal application of its own social values;
- i. The transfer of American technology to developing countries, especially nuclear technology. America's fears that this technology might lead countries such as South Korea and Taiwan to develop their own nuclear capabilities are unjustified, since that option would be employed only in the event that American security commitments could no longer be relied upon.

CONCLUSION

In addition to assessing the future course of regional developments from the indicators and trends observable today, it is also important to consider various ideas as to how to build a stable international environment in the Western Pacific in the 1980's.

One of these ideas, as suggested by Japanese analyst Jiro Tokuyama, is the creation of an Asia Pacific Community.² This Community would serve as a framework for economic cooperation in the region, and would include the United States, Canada, Japan, Korea, Taiwan, ASEAN, and perhaps China. But the security of the region can not rely only on an organization such as this. And even the act of establishing such a Community could itself prove difficult, given that steadily mounting tensions, especially between China and the Soviet Union, could rapidly and drastically alter the entire regional environment. Reappearing conflicts could thus destroy the cooperative foundation required for the establishment and maintenance of a stable international framework in the region.

Within such an unstable international environment, the United States should initiate the following measures:

- a. intensify efforts to develop meaningful and regularized consultations with its friends in the region;
- b. formulate a comprehensive set of long-range policies toward the Asia Pacific region;

² See Jiro Tokuyama, "The Advantages of a Pacific Economic Basin", *Far Eastern Economic Review*, March 23, 1979

- c. strengthen the domestic support for the implementation of these policies, most importantly among the leadership of Congress and the Administration.

An effective American role in the Western Pacific requires flexible relations and flexible policies capable of meeting the diverse and rapidly changing challenges that will inevitably arise in this region characterized by uncertainty.

THE SURGE FOR HIGHER EDUCATION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA*

Harsja W. BACHTIAR

Contemporary universities and their sister institutions of higher education in our Southeast Asian region are essentially modern phenomena. Admittedly, in some countries, like Thailand, institutions of higher education are already known since ancient times. In the far historical past, practically all of these institutions of higher learning were centers for the study of religion and its derivations. In some countries, some of the contemporary universities have a long, venerable existence, such as the well-known University of Santo Tomas, established in the Philippines in 1611.

Nevertheless, the present institutions of higher education tend to be in many respects new phenomena. Learning tends to be dominated by modern knowledge originating from the more modern societies in Europe and America. The universities are assuming an increasingly strategic function in our societies, particularly in development endeavors. While in the past the institutions of higher education were mainly concerned with the maintenance, the preservation of the cherished cultural traditions, at present there is a strong tendency, at times somewhat too strong a tendency, to concentrate on endeavors to bring about change, innovations, in the existing conditions. The universities are looked at as sources of the much desired changes, as agents of modernization. There is a general acknowledgement of and trust in the capacity of the universities to benefit society and the multitudinous individuals who together constitute this societal community.

We are aware, and the present conference is a distinct manifestation of this awareness, that there is a rising demand for higher education in our respective countries, in our region. There is growing pressure on our institutions of higher education to expand their capacity to accept students,

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fulltime students as well as part-time students. In a relatively short span of time many new institutions of higher education have been set up. The number of institutions of higher education in each of our countries is becoming larger. The number of student enrollment at many institutions of higher education is also becoming larger.

At the same time, we witness increasing differentiation, if not proliferation, among and within the institutions of higher education, such as institutions maintained by the state and institutions maintained by private organizations; universities, institutes, colleges, higher schools, and academies; faculties, departments, chairs and teaching programs; teaching activities and research activities; one semester programs, one year programs, two year programs, four year programs, five year programs, and others; diploma and degree programs; and so on. All these and many more are the visible signs of the consequence of the growing demands for higher education.

However, with the ever-increasing demand for more rapid growth and expansion of our systems of higher education there are also severe limitations, constraints, in the endeavor to meet the demand, or, rather, the needs which induce the demand. One of the most serious limiting constraints is, of course, the severe shortage of adequately trained academic personnel.

We have, then, a situation where the needs are larger than the capacity to fulfill them. In order to produce optimum results with our limited facilities, it is logically necessary to establish priorities, to construct systematic plans for the future, and to make rational decisions based on the adopted plans. In reality the complexity of demands and pressures, combined with the complexity of differentiation within the total system of higher education in all our countries and an essentially democratic structure of the relevant polities, virtually guarantee the growth of our institutions of higher education without much relevance to detailed overall planning.

Nevertheless, it might be worthwhile to examine the relevant phenomena — the nature of the needs for higher education — to acquire some better notion of the relevant realities. A better notion of the relevant realities should help, at least, us to think and act on a more rational basis in our own general endeavor to attend to the growing demands for more and better higher education in our region.

Let me, then, in the brief compass of this presentation, try to discuss the needs and demands for higher education on two analytically distinct levels, firstly by discussing the demands with respect to the needs of the cultural system of our societies and, secondly, by discussing the demands

with respect to the needs of the various sectors of our societies and certain types of social collectivities therein.

The two levels are intricately related to each other although not necessarily in complete agreement. The existence of social collectivities — groups, organizations — in our societies enables the persistence and growth of the cultural system, while the prevalence of a cultural system in each of our societies provides the intellectual resources, such as beliefs, values, norms, knowledge and symbols for aesthetic expressions, for the conduct of social action; in fact, for the totality of activities which constitutes the manifestation of what we usually refer to as society.

THE NEEDS OF OUR CULTURAL SYSTEMS

Each of our societies has its own cultural system, consisting of religious beliefs, moral values and norms, empirical knowledge, and expressive elements which serve as sources of information in the determination of activities of the individuals who comprise the members of our societies. Our cultural systems, transmitted by means of a commonly understood language or a number of languages which are used as media of communication by different parts of the population in our countries, provide us with information and guidelines as to what can be done, what should be done, and the manner to have it done. A diversity of cultural patterns are routinely internalized, learned, by those individuals whose activities are the manifestation of the various sectors of our societies, becoming part of their personalities.

Consequently, the specific content of each of these cultural systems is crucial to the capacity of the individuals who together constitute the relevant society in their endeavor to acquire the means to maintain themselves in the face of their changing environment and in the endeavor to attain their collective goals.

Following T. Parsons, the eminent American sociologist, we can distinguish the existence of four categories of cultural objects in our societies' cultural systems. The first category consists of those symbols which refer to non-empirical phenomena; in other words, our beliefs. There are certain beliefs which are held in common by all members of our society. The beliefs are usually recognized as the core of our society's religion(s), although not all beliefs have a religious reference. In addition to these nationally held collective beliefs there are many other beliefs, but this is not the place to describe each of these beliefs and the various individuals who are associated with these beliefs. It is sufficient to note that these particularized beliefs are also part of our cultural system, making

sense of what are otherwise difficult to comprehend. The adoption of these beliefs have ordinarily wide-range implications, affecting the thoughts and activities of the believers.

The second category of cultural objects consists of moral evaluative symbolization, the values which indicate what should be regarded as desirable and the innumerable norms which specify what is expected of the acting individuals in the performance of their various social roles. The prevalence of these moral evaluative symbols contributes to the maintenance of a measure of order in the activities of the members of society in their relations to each other, the embodiment of a moral community.

The third category of cultural objects consists of the expressive modes of symbolization. These expressive symbolizations are primarily associated with the desires of individual personalities. In our societies this particular category of cultural objects tends to be linked to our kinship relations which have primary functions in the management of emotional tensions and in ordering the motivations of individual personalities in relation to their roles.

The fourth category of cultural objects, and the one which we are at the moment primarily interested in, is the cognitive rationality complex, the cultural objects with cognitive primacy, the foci of interest of our contemporary institutions of higher education.

These four categories of cultural objects are linked to each other, the one influencing the other. A given category, such as religious beliefs, may dominate the other cultural objects, permeating the entire cultural system.

Most cultural systems in our Southeast Asian region are characterized by traditionalism, an attachment to the past, based on the belief of the superiority of the past to the present. These traditional beliefs are basically not compatible with giving primacy to cognitive rationality, to scientific theory, to rational — scientific technology, the components of our cultural system which have bearing on the capacity of the members of our societies — the individuals — and our societies as such to utilize knowledge in the endeavor to attain human goals.

There is a vast multitude of problems brought about by economic, social, political, technological and other changes coming from within our societies. There is also a multitude of problems brought about by changes induced by influence, or even pressure, from outside our region.

In order to be able to meet and overcome these harassing problems on the basis of rational knowledge of the relevant realities, it is almost im-

perative to greatly expand the number and quality of highly educated members of our society. They, and only they, are in a position to develop the cognitive rationality complex of each of our cultural systems. We need many more individuals with higher education in each of the many academic disciplines and modern professions. Our cultural systems are in much need of individuals who are able to develop the existing cultural patterns in accordance with the mass of objective problems which have emerged and cry for adequate solutions. Our societies are rapidly becoming more and more complex and the scope, magnitude, of our problems become larger and larger. Traditional thinking and common sense are not anymore sufficient to deal with many of our contemporary problems.

Expansion of cognitive knowledge — the growth of scientific and scholarly knowledge — necessitates a significant upgrading of our education. The level of academic instruction should be much higher than the present level, not only on paper but in reality. The existing knowledge should be much more widely disseminated than is now the case. The existing knowledge should be continuously improved and expanded by the results of research activities, conducted by our own scientists and scholars in our own region.

Not only the cognitive rationality complex of our cultural system has to develop, but also the other complexes of our cultural systems. Otherwise, and this is in many respects already happening, we will have a serious imbalance, causing strains, among the four main categories of cultural objects which together constitute our cultural systems. Therefore, in addition to more highly educated scientists and scholars in the natural sciences and technology and in the social sciences, we also need more highly educated personnel in the field of religion, philosophy, law, literature, and the arts, persons versed in the humanities of both old and new, persons who are able to maintain continuity in the necessary development of our cultural systems. These persons, who are expected to come from our universities, should also be able to continuously adjust the various components of our cultural systems to each other in order to prevent the occurrence of pathological phenomena as a result of serious imbalances in the development of the four cultural complexes.

A constituent part of our cultural systems is the notion of higher education itself and the idea of university education as something worth striving for. Before the notion of modern higher education was introduced into our cultural systems, mainly by foreign agencies or indigenous persons who had become acquainted with modern higher education in Europe or America, there was no need for modern higher education in our countries. At present, the notion of higher education has become part of each of our national culture, although in varying degrees

of complexity. It has become something meaningful and is associated with a diversity of ideas, such as the idea of an intellectual elite which actually conflicts with the equally adopted idea of social equality, the idea of basically unlimited opportunities for development which conflicts with the idea of the preservation of tradition, and the idea of rationality which conflicts with beliefs.

Be what it may, the notion of higher education and the idea of university education as something worth striving for are generally spreading out in our societies, reaching more and more people. Awareness of the notion may eventually generate a need, a desire, to get access to it and through it to acquire the more superior knowledge and skills which hopefully enables one to release himself and his set from the living conditions to which their parents and ancestors had been tied and to spend the remaining years of their precious life in better, continuously improving conditions.

I submit, then, that with reference to the necessary development of our cultural systems there is an inescapable overwhelming need for higher education in our countries.

THE DEMANDS OF OUR SOCIETIES

Let us now turn our attention to various sectors of our societies and some types of their social collectivities.

To begin with, we are faced with the well-known fact that the social positions in our societies carry different degrees of prestige and that the presence of social inequality is closely linked with disparities in access to political power, influence, wealth, and other facilities, including, I may add, higher education. The historical development of our societies have positioned the largest part of our populations as members of the lower classes, consisting mostly of the peasantry, practically living in social bondage. The previously mainly hereditary elites tended to be small, monopolizing, as it were, the scarce goods in our societies.

The introduction and development of modern education, especially higher education, in our countries opened the way for the replacement of the application of the principle of hereditary rights to the attainment of the higher positions in society by the application of the principle of competence, the possession of knowledge and skills required for the performance of activities associated with these positions. It is not enough anymore to be the son of a high functionary in order to be able to acquire a high position; a person must have the competence to carry out the responsibilities which are linked to the position. Gradually, if a person is

not the son of a highly positioned person but does have the competence to perform the required activities of a high position, he or she too can attain the position.

The more people are aware of the fact that higher education offers possibilities for advancement, the more people will demand access to higher education. The more people from the lower classes become part of the higher classes, the more the likelihood for a narrowing of the prevailing social distance between the higher and the lower classes, the greater the tendency for the realization of more social equality.

Thus, the existence of social stratification structures together with educational opportunities leading up to higher education contains the seeds for the rapid growth of needs, and then demands, for acquiring higher education as a means to liberate at least the intellectually more gifted persons from their traditional social bondage as members of the lower classes. It is, of course, true, that persons coming from the lower classes still encounter greater difficulties than persons from the upper classes in acquiring opportunities for higher education, a phenomenon which ought to be remedied as much as possible.

The historical development of our societies also resulted in a geographical concentration of educational facilities at the higher levels, a situation which is only recently being changed. Even on the secondary school level, the distribution of educational facilities, particularly with respect to quality, is not balanced, creating a situation where certain ethnic societies and racial groupings have access to better and more numerous educational facilities than others. This imbalance in the mastery of knowledge and skills among a diversity of ethnic societies and racial groupings within most of our countries is reflected in the social, economic, political and cultural relationships among these social categories, a tendency of the educationally superior ethnic or racial groupings to dominate the less educationally equipped, a sort of internal imperialism.

In order to bring about a better balance in the positions of the participating ethnic societies and racial groupings vis-à-vis each other, it is imperative to recognize the great need among the less educationally equipped ethnic societies and racial groupings to acquire better access to higher education facilities and, on the basis of this recognition, to make systematic efforts to facilitate the endeavors to fulfill this need, before the general situation becomes uncontrollable.

I will not continue this enumeration of sectors of our respective society where the needs for higher education are manifestly present or still dormant hidden, but if I did we would find innumerable other types of

social collectivities which will eventually become conscious of the benefits that can be obtained from higher education and, following this, demand their rightful share of the higher education facilities of their society. These too will demand the right to strengthen their intellectual capacity to free themselves from previously constricting limitations and to acquire the means to improve their members' quality of life. When these new, presently dormant demands will become manifest and exert pressure on our systems of higher education is difficult to predict. It can be tomorrow, next year, ten years from now. It is also difficult to predict whether the demands from the various sectors, or social collectivities, will grow gradually or make their appearance simultaneously, all of a sudden.

On the whole, improvement of the capacity of our societies to maintain their identity and political integration in a world which is increasingly dominated by science and technology, requires a systematic upgrading of our citizenry's general knowledge, with a much larger portion, compared to the present situation, acquiring general education on the tertiary level, beyond the high school level.

Even those who specialize in a discipline or profession ought to acquire knowledge which is not limited to their discipline or profession of concentration, given the nature of the problems which have to be solved and the condition of our societies. It is the task of our universities to educate students in such a manner that they broaden their minds instead of narrowing their range of vision and thinking. This requirement applies in particular to those who are expected to become leaders in our societies.

The on-going and very likely accelerating modernization process demands the formation of more and more people who have competence in the application of cognitive knowledge to practical problems. The construction of larger transportation and communication networks necessitates persons knowledgeable and skilled in technology, persons expected to be trained in institutions of higher education. Similarly, factories and other modern structural forms cannot be established without the availability of competent engineers. Hospitals, medical clinics and other health facilities require medical doctors and related professionally trained individuals. Judiciary courts, legal bureaus in departments and business firms, legal consultation offices, and a whole range of activities in the legal field require trained lawyers. One can go on with much a listing of types of social collectivities and social roles which require persons who have acquired higher education but, I trust, that the few examples mentioned are sufficient to note the many needs for the training of future practitioners in the application of knowledge to practical problems.

Universities and research organizations have to acquire persons who are competent in research activities in order to undertake their research functions. We should acknowledge the fact that most of our universities and other institutions of higher education are primarily teaching organizations and are not yet much engaged in the production of knowledge. Too much of our immediate natural, social and cultural environment is still not adequately known. Therefore, there is urgent need for the training of a multitude of persons who are committed to research and competent to do so in many fields of scientific and scholarly inquiry.

And, naturally, there is need, much need, for the training of the coming academic personnel, those who have to teach at our institutions of higher education, the present institutions as well as the institutions of higher education which are yet to be established. It would be impossible to improve and enlarge our higher education facilities without creating more academic personnel who can be added to the presently already existing academic personnel and who eventually will have to replace them.

ALREADY A SURPLUS OF HIGH-LEVEL MANPOWER?

But is there not already a surplus of university graduates and graduates of other institutions of higher education in our region? Isn't it a fact that many individuals with higher education degrees are unemployed, or have much difficulty in getting employment? Governments, educators, and other responsible people have noted with increasing apprehension the emergence of a growing large number of individuals who have studied at institutions of higher education but are without jobs, without proper source of livelihood, without responsibilities and, consequently, with a high measure of dissatisfaction, anger, and disposition to act negatively; the emergence, in other words, of an intellectual proletariat.

Quite a number of persons with academic qualifications leave, or have left, their country of origin to work elsewhere. More than a decade ago, an official report noted that more than half of the scientists, engineers, and physicians who immigrated to the USA in 1967 came from developing countries. A study of those Philippines who graduated from college in the years 1948 to 1963 reveals that 'about seven per cent eventually take up permanent residence elsewhere.' The picture looks even more striking with respect to those who studied abroad after college because 'about 40 per cent eventually emigrate,' leaving their country of origin.

The emigration of persons in the professional, technical and kindred occupations to more developed countries are not necessarily caused by a push out of their respective country of origin where they failed to obtain employment. Emigration of university graduates, usually referred to as 'brain-drain,' is to a great extent caused by the lure of attraction — the pull — of countries where these persons have access to more superior resources, countries where, in economic terms, a person can earn the highest return, or countries where working conditions, particularly for scientists and scholars, are much better than in their respective country of origin.

Phenomena such as the formation of an intellectual proletariat and what is usually referred to as 'brain-drain' are not indicators of the lack of need for higher education but are rather, on the one hand, indicators of the limitation of the capacity of the various sectors of society to engage university graduates in given fields of knowledge in spite of the fact that the knowledge and skills of these persons are actually needed; and are, on the other hand, indicators of failure of the graduates to adjust themselves to conditions which do not meet their expectations, perhaps as the consequence of comparisons with experience elsewhere. In the public sector the limitation of the capacity to absorb university graduates is in many cases a function of budgetary constraints with respect to the size of government personnel. There is, then, no real surplus of university graduates; the needs are very much still there.

There is, of course, no fool-proof effective way to prevent the formation of dissatisfied, dissident, rebellious or even revolutionary elements, next to the more traditional and more constructive, progressive elements of the educated classes within or outside the existing institutions of higher education in our region. And, after all, successful revolutionary university graduates, such as Sun Yat Sen and Mao Tse-tung in China, Jose Rizal in the Philippines, Soekarno and Hatta in Indonesia, Jawaharlal Nehru and Mahatma Gandhi in India, and Jomo Kenyatta in Kenya, are now highly honored as fathers of their nations.

COMPARISON WITH THE MORE EDUCATIONALLY DEVELOPED SOCIETIES

But let us not limit our attention to our own region. Let us briefly glance at the state of affairs in more educationally developed countries in order to get some comparative perspective as to the magnitude of our problem. By paying attention to some of the advanced countries I am not, of course, suggesting that our societies will necessarily develop in such a manner as to acquire the characteristics of these particular countries,

characteristics which are not all entirely attractive. I am not even suggesting that it is desirable to work in that direction.

The purpose of the comparison is to enable us to assess our present relative weakness, our vulnerability, in terms of the level and extent of cognitive knowledge at the disposal of our societies in comparison to the level and extend of cognitive knowledge at the disposal of these more educationally developed countries, a condition which has much bearing on the capacity of our societies to improve the quality of life of the population in our region and to adjust our societies to the multi-faceted rapidly changing environment.

While, with the exception of the largest university in the Philippines, the number of students enrolled in our largest universities does not exceed 50.000 students — in Indonesia the largest university does not have more than 20.000 students — in the USA the State University of New York had an enrollment of 225.461 students in 1977. In the same year the California State University and College System had an enrollment of 182.543 students, followed, in accordance with the size of enrollment, by the City University of New York with 122.469 students; the University of California with 119.843 students; and the University of Wisconsin System with 108.620 students.

In a survey of 1.593 institutions of higher education in the USA, comprised of universities, four year colleges, upper division or senior colleges and/or graduate professional schools, and those junior colleges administered by the schools in prior categories, it is reported that there were 4.947.412 full-time students and a grand-total of 6.909.758 students, at a time when the USA had a population of 215 million people.

At present, educators and other interested people are already engaged in discussions on the possibility of still further development of higher education in the USA, from mass education — the present state of affairs — to universal education, a situation where all individuals of the relevant age cohort would be students enrolled at institutions of higher education.

Compare the American figures with some of the relevant figures in our region. In Indonesia the total student enrollment at institutions of higher education is only about 350.000 students for a population of more than 136 million people. In Thailand the comparable figures are about 75.000 students for 44 million people; in Malaysia, 30.000 students for 13 million people; in Singapore, about 28.000 students for 2.5 million people; and in the Philippines, our region's most educated country, about 1 million for 44 million people.

As to the amount of knowledge kept as university library resources at the disposal of teachers, students, researchers and other interested per-

sons in the developed countries, we are, again, very much behind. In addition to the more national libraries, such as the State V.I. Lenin Library of the USSR in Moscow, the Library of Congress in Washington, the Bibliotheque Nationale in Paris, the British Museum Library in London, the Deutsche Staatsbibliothek in Berlin and the National Library in Peking — the largest national libraries in the world mentioned in accordance with the size of their respective collections —, the students, scholars and scientists at the most outstanding institutions of higher education have access to extraordinary, in Southeast Asia unimaginable large collections of printed sources of information: Harvard University Library has 8.859.480 volumes; Yale University Library has 6.175.170 volumes; the University of Illinois has 4.920.170 volumes; Columbia University Libraries has 4.473.900 volumes; the University of California, Berkeley, Cal., Library has 4.318.210 volumes; Cornell University Libraries has 4.042.500 volumes; Stanford University Libraries has 3.851.260 volumes and 17.503.000 manuscripts; the University of Michigan Libraries has 3.734.340 volumes; the Bodleian Library of Oxford has 3.646.870 volumes; and the University of Chicago Library has 3.334.150 volumes.

Their utility is even more maximized by a system of inter-university loan cooperation, not to mention the utilization of extensive photo-copy and micro-form reproduction facilities.

The more advanced countries have, in terms of both quality and quantity, educationally superior human resources which inevitably affect our weaker societies. Being in a much weaker position, we have to endeavor to strengthen ourselves by the enhancement of our society's capacity to maintain and generate resources of all kinds to improve the chances of attaining our respective societal goals in the face of an international environment which continuously exert pressure on our societies. The enhancement of our societies' capacity to maintain and generate resources depends very much on the number and degree of competence of our educated citizens, particularly those who have studied at institutions of higher education.

CONCLUSION

These observations, although far from exhaustive, suggest the existence of a great diversity of needs for higher education in our region of Southeast Asia. The existing needs have a strong tendency to grow in strength, number and complexity, exerting pressure on our already overburdened institutions of higher education to accept more new students, both full-time as well as part-time students; to improve the existing academic programs while instituting new, much needed programs; to

conduct more and better research activities; to expand public services activities, increasingly felt as the right of the society where the institutions are located; and, at the same time, to preserve and, if possible, to develop further the prevailing, much treasured inherited cultural traditions of the nation.

These pressures are particularly exerted on the universities. These pressure can and frequently do become political pressures, political issues of a sufficiently grave nature as to cause anxiety on the part of higher education administrators and government officials, and perhaps even more anxiety among the youngsters who, for one reason or other, want to continue their study after having graduated from the secondary school, and their concerned parents who both feel that their offsprings' future is at stake.

In what manner do our institutions of higher education respond to the increasingly strong demands of their society? In what manner do our governments respond to these demands? In what manner do higher education oriented associations, such as ASAIHL, respond to these very real needs and demands?

I tried to indicate that these real needs for higher education are not actually limited to the demands as articulated in words or in visible action, such as the angry words of a frustrated father, demanding that his son or daughter be accepted by the university; the tearsome plea of a mother; the better reaction of a youngster when notified of his rejection by the university where he wishes to study; the flood of articles, letters to the editor, news items and editorials expressing anxiety for the difficulty of highschool graduates to enter the good universities and other institutions of higher education; resolutions in Parliament; frantic instructions from the Minister of Education and other persons in authority; and, sometimes, protest demonstrations in the streets.

There are also needs, real needs, of our societies which are not yet felt as such but are already present, very much like the lack of proper nutrition among many sectors of our population who themselves may not be aware of the fact that their bodies are in need of better nutrition and that better nutrition should be accessible to them to provide them with the proper means for adequate survival.

If we as a people in our respective country do want to be masters in our own house, our own society, our own region, or continue to be masters in our own land, our own country, in an increasingly modern world, it is imperative to rapidly expand the accessibility of our facilities

for higher education to our youngsters, the upcoming generations in our respective society. More, many more youngsters ought to be given the chance, the opportunity, to acquire higher education.

But, and here is our inescapable, agonizing dilemma, this higher education ought to be genuine higher education. It should not consist of teaching programs which only have the semblance of higher education but do not actually improve, develop, the capacity of the students to perform in their respective field of principle endeavor. Too many of our present so-called academic programs, particularly in the social sciences, do not really develop our students' capacity to think rationally on the basis of systematic knowledge, grounded in the objective realities of our own environment, our own country, our own region.

It is, therefore, only natural that many university graduates become the basic ingredients for the disturbing formation of an intellectual proletariat. They have no choice. They are the victims of a big, perhaps unintentional deception, a big fraud. They are convinced that they have acquired higher education, that they are knowledgeable, and consequently expect employment in conformity with their diploma, their degree. However, the potential employers only want to accept persons who are able to perform in conformity with knowledge and skills which are generally associated with these diplomas and degrees, knowledge skills which the applicants unfortunately frequently do not really possess. They possess the proper papers but not the kind of things that are symbolized by these papers.

We are very much behind in the expansion of our educated classes. As nations we are still educationally poor, if not destitute, in spite of the fact that in each of our Southeast Asian countries there is an increasingly large number of highly educated persons who have no difficulty in being compared favorably with their colleagues in the more developed countries, such as those in the United States, England, France, or the Soviet Union. On the whole, we still suffer from a severe scarcity of academically trained, or professional, people. The average cognitive knowledge of the population in our region is still very low, again in spite of the existence of some truly excellent centers of higher education in our region.

This means, that we are still in a very unfavorable position vis-à-vis the more educationally developed countries, including such Asian countries as India, China and Japan. It means that in many ways we are forced to act as subservient clients in our relations with many much more educationally superior foreign countries, relationships which in our present-day technological world we cannot avoid.

It is this for us unfavorable situation which constitutes the basis of my argument that the needs, the demands, for higher education — genuine higher education — in our Southeast Asian region is truly tremendous.

A CHILD-CENTRED APPROACH TO BIOLOGY EDUCATION RELEVANT TO NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT*

G. Wayan SEREGEG

INTRODUCTION

Indonesia is an archipelago consisting of 13,677 islands, of which 6,044 are inhabited. Over 60 percent of the area is forest which has so far been little exploited. Only about 12 percent of the total land area is cultivated, as much as 70 percent of that in Java. Another 10 percent of cultivated land is used mainly for rubber, coconut and tea plantations. The country has important oil reserves. There are also substantial deposits of tin, bauxite, copper, coal, manganese, nickel and iron, together with some gold and silver.

The population was 119.2 million in 1971, with a growth rate of 2.3 percent per annum. About 76 million people, or 64 percent of the population are concentrated in Java, which with only 7 percent of the country's land area, has the extremely high density of 565 persons per square kilometer. This figure is relatively high compared with those of the whole country (59), Kalimantan (9) and Irian Jaya (2).

Employment and the economy are predominantly rural. About 70 percent of the population is employed in the agricultural sector. The agricultural sector occupies over two thirds of employed persons and provides almost half the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Nevertheless, food production is below domestic consumption and the country has required substantial imports of basic foodstuffs. Industry, as is indicated by the small proportion of persons employed in it, is little developed.

Since achieving independence, the Central Government has felt the need to further promote the concept of national unity through educa-

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tion. The government has central control over the entire educational system. This centralized control poses a number of difficulties as the Indonesian people, from a cultural viewpoint, truly represent unity in diversity. Communication is often difficult owing to the large number of islands and to the limited development of mechanical transport. Pearse (1973) argues that this cultural diversity stretches over an archipelago of more than six thousand islands and that the difficulty of communication between regions thus limits the capacity of the Central Government to initiate changes in the system. The diversity of the ethnic groupings together with the strength of local sentiments and loyalties makes for a greater degree of decentralization and local initiative.

The existing Indonesian education system stems from its Dutch colonial predecessor; this country had been under Dutch control for about 350 years before she proclaimed independence on 17 August 1945. Both the native and the European systems have had important influences on educational conditions in this country. Although many attempts have been made to reform the present unsatisfactory situation, but it is not likely that the Dutch influence on education can be totally eliminated. Crellin (1976) maintains that although this country has now been independent for more than 30 years, the structure and practices of the Indonesian educational system have not changed significantly from the system of the colonial times. And Mauldin (1961) argues that although the colonial system has now been officially abolished in Indonesia, the mould of the colonial system cannot be eliminated so quickly; in fact, it can never be eradicated from the course of Indonesian educational development.

Indonesian educators are fully aware of these weaknesses in their educational system. Though they recognize that it is essentially a transplant of the Dutch system, they are not sure what to do about it. To attempt to change the whole system would surely stir up great opposition from the public, parents, and teachers, for the teachers have been trained according to the Dutch system.

The basic educational task in Indonesia, then, is to find new technologies of primary education which can be utilized effectively by low-paid, poorly educated, and unqualified teachers (Beeby, 1966). Therefore this paper is concerned with primary education, most particularly with education in the subject of biology, as relevant to national development. In this paper "national development" is taken to mean the development in children that is, investment in human beings, rather than physical or material development as such.

EXISTING BIOLOGY EDUCATION

In 1950 the Indonesian Education Act was passed; it included (among others) the following:

Article 3: The aim of instruction and education is to form moral and capable human beings and democratic citizens with a sense of responsibility toward the prosperity of society and country.

Article 4: Instruction and education are based on the principles embodied in *Pancasila*¹, the Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia and the culture of the Indonesian nation.

Article 5: Indonesian as the *Unifying language* is the language of instruction in schools throughout the Republic of Indonesia. In Kindergarten and the first three grades of the primary schools, the local languages *may* be used as the language of instruction.

In 1965 the government began a period of stocktaking in all fields, including education, in order to see what the real situation was, and began planning realistically for the future. This resulted in an overall Five Year Development Plan.

In 1969 the Central Government proposed a national development plan, called the *Repelita I* (First Five Year Development Plan). The order of priority to be given was:

- (a) increase of food production;
- (b) increase of foreign earnings;
- (c) development of internal transportation;
- (d) development of industry, especially those kinds — such as fertilizers and food processing industries — which are allied with the development of food production;
- (e) tourism.

The Ministry of Education and Culture declared that one of the objectives of educational development should be to facilitate and promote development in these sectors.

Repelita I emphasized more educational expansion, providing more seats for the school-aged population, rather than raising educational quality. On the other hand, *Repelita II*, 1974-1979, as a sequel to *Repelita I*, emphasized educational relevance, effectiveness, and efficiency. This means that the rationale of the educational development plan is: (1) to achieve the desired results with economy of time and effort relative to the amount of work accomplished; (2) to present ideas and activities through a teaching unit that most facilitates the regular and systematic development of the learner; (3) to contribute to the aims of national development.

1 Five Principles of the state philosophy

The strategy for the newest educational policy is an *objectives-oriented approach*. The hierarchical levels of the strategy are arranged as follows: (a) institutional objectives – general objectives which should be achieved by the school concerned; (b) curricular objectives – the objectives of a particular subject; and (c) instructional objectives – the objectives which should be achieved by a course unit. The instructional objectives are furthermore divided into general and specific instructional objectives.

The institutional, curricular, and general instructional objectives are formulated by the Ministry of Education and Culture, c.q. the BP3K (Office of Educational and Cultural Research and Development) and the Directorate General for Primary and Secondary Education. The proposals of the two Sub-Ministerial levels resulted in a Basic Course Outline (BCO). The BCO contains (a) institutional objectives and structure of the curriculum; (b) curricular objectives, (c) general instructional objectives, (d) syllabus – organization of contents, and (e) other information and guides on how to implement the curriculum.

The BCO is further developed in the *1975 Curriculum* and the curriculum for the *Proyek Perintis Sekolah Pembangunan* (PPSP – Development School Project).

The general instructional objectives set in the BCO for biology are:

- a) acquiring basic knowledge and concepts about the environment;
- b) acquiring basic knowledge of the interrelationship among the various environmental phenomena;
- c) to understand the interdependence between an organism and its environment;
- d) to develop a sense of curiosity;
- e) to acquire the arts and skills of problem-solving;
- f) to develop communication skills;
- g) to learn to apply the acquired knowledge.

The 1975 Curriculum legalized in January 1975 has been implemented since January 1976. Technically, it is supervised by the Directorate-General for Primary and Secondary Education. This curriculum uses substantially the BCO but the teaching methods have remained unchanged from the old curricula and are still teacher-centred. This curriculum has been tried out in traditional schools.

The teaching materials used in the 1975 Curriculum schools depend a great deal on the individual teacher. In these schools teachers do not adhere to the sequence of the pupil's handbooks. Instead, they develop sub-topics, based on the BCO, into a teaching programme, called *PPSI* (Procedure of Instructional system). It should be pointed out here that the PPSI is essentially a weekly or monthly teaching programme consisting of

(a) the name of the subject taught, (b) the topic to be presented, (c) the grade level to be taught, (d) the term or semester, (e) the number of periods, (f) general instructional objectives – developed by the teacher based on the general instructional objectives adopted from the BCO, (g) specific instructional objectives – developed by the teacher based on the general instructional ones, (h) types of teaching/learning to be employed, (i) teaching aids for the teaching/learning process, and (j) the method of evaluation.

In 1973 the Ministry of Education and Culture designed the PPSP (Development School Project). The Master Design of the PPSP was completed in September 1973. Among the more important decisions made at the time were: (1) there would be one programme to be developed and tested at all eight development schools – in Surabaya, Malang, Yogyakarta, Semarang, Bandung, Jakarta, Padang and Ujung Pandang; (2) the system would cater to students who enter and leave school at varying times; (3) *the teaching would be child-centred*; (4) the system would involve continuous progress assessment for each student; and (5) each teaching programme would undergo two phases of trial rewriting, with a target date set for dissemination of the first tested programme in 1979.

The PPSP is technically conducted by the BP3K. The teaching method to be used was considered very carefully and it was decided to adopt a self-instructional, self-paced modular form of instruction.

In the Indonesian curriculum plan, “modular instruction” means a packet of suggestions for teachers and learning materials for students that can be used for pursuing specific learning objectives for a period of time that may be as short as fifteen minutes or as long as six or eight class periods distributed over three or four weeks (Thomas, 1974).

The instructional module is thus a packet of materials containing two sub-packets: (1) directions for the teacher who will conduct the course; and (2) self-instructional materials to be used by the pupils who are taking the course.

The sub-packet containing directions for the teacher consists of (*after Thomas*):

1) *A description of specific learning objectives.*

These objectives are written in a special form called *student behaviour*. Each objective outlines the sort of actions students should be able to carry out as a result of their learning. This form of objective can be illustrated by giving two sample learning objectives from the module on the structure of the corn plant. Two specific objectives of that module are to prepare pupils to:

- a) Identify which parts of the corn plant are seeds that can be used to grow new corn plants;

- b) Describe the process of pollination in corn plants and identify the portions of the plant involved on this process.

The list of specific objectives in each module clearly points out to the classroom teacher the kinds of acts or knowledge pupils should be able to display by the time they have completed the module.

- 2) *A Teacher's guide sheet*, explains to the teacher the ways the lesson can be most efficiently taught. The guide sheet also suggests various activities that the class might pursue, depending upon such factors as the location of the school and the amount of time the teacher wants to spent on the module.

The sub-packet used by the pupils contains:

- 1) *Reading materials for the pupils*. In most cases, an instructional module will not simply recommend that the pupils read a particular textbook. Rather, most modules have their own text materials for the pupils to read. These text materials have been written especially to achieve the goals of the individual module.
- 2) *Worksheet for the pupils*. The reading materials in most modules are written in a manner that obliges pupils to be active learners. That is, distributed throughout the pages are questions to be answered and problems to be solved. Worksheets for the students' answers and solutions accompany the readings.
- 3) *Answer sheet for worksheet problems*. Not only is modular instruction designed to encourage constant active problem-solving by pupils, but it also provides opportunities for them to evaluate their own learning. Correct answers for the worksheet problems are included in the module packet. In some cases the pupil can look up the correct answers himself in the back of his study pamphlet.
- 4) *Evaluation device*. It should be obvious that if answers to worksheet problems are provided in the back of a pupil's study pamphlet, it would be possible for pupils to copy the answers onto their worksheet and give the impression that they have mastered the learning, where actually they have not. Consequently, each module includes evaluation methods that the teacher uses with the pupils after they have completed their pamphlets and other study assignments. The teacher's judgement as to how well the pupils have actually mastered the objectives is based on these final evaluation devices rather than on the answers on the pupil's worksheet.

Do all pupils study all the modules in the series? No, not all pupils are expected to complete modules. Modules are divided into two general types, basic and enrichment. Basic modules make up the sequence of study that will be followed by all pupils, except those who suffer particular learning disabilities. By completing the sets of basic modules in a subject area, a pupil qualifies for promotion to the next step in the school structure. The basic modules are prepared in a form that permits nearly 85 percent or more of the pupils in an average class to complete them successfully in a given amount of time. The enrichment modules have extra study objectives and activities that are furnished to students who complete the basic modules before their classmates.

The purposes of combining basic and enrichment modules are (1) to furnish all pupils with basic learning in common and at the same time, (2) to enable each pupil to progress continually according to his abilities, degree of motivation, and areas of interests. Thus pupils with greater

ability are not required to wait until average or slower pupils complete the lesson.

A typical module does not consist of uninterrupted pages of reading material, then a series of thought questions at the end. Instead, it contains problems, activities, and questions to be answered on every page or so. The pupil reads a portion, then actively works through some questions or activity related to what he has just read. In this way the pamphlets are more self-instructional than the typical textbook, and they provide constant information to the pupil on how well he is mastering each page or two of learning material.

What then is the role of the teacher? Throughout the class period, each pupil works by himself, reading the pamphlet, handling the equipment as the instructions in the pamphlet indicate, and writing answers to questions on the worksheet. During this time, the teacher does not lecture, nor does he conduct question-answer sessions. Rather, he moves about the class, observing each pupil's progress and assisting them in interpreting the pamphlet materials, in reading the diagrams, and in dissecting the specimen the pamphlet requires him to analyse. This method of instruction then turns the teacher into a guide, motivator, supervisor, and evaluator.

Pupils in the modular instruction system learn in groups, but these groups are often adjusted after each test according to the performance of each pupil. The pupil who scores 75 percent on this test will be allowed to proceed to the next basic module whilst the pupil who fails will be required to go through a revision exercise, known as *remedial teaching*.

THE SUBSTANCE OF BIOLOGY

Biology has at least two main characteristics: (1) a body of acquired information, and (2) a strategy of acquiring that knowledge. But throughout the history of curriculum making, one of these two characteristics has been emphasized, at times, to the detriment of the other, since one emphasizes the content *per se* while the other looks to the mental discipline, that is, scientific or critical thinking, the ability to solve problems, and the method of inquiry.

Taking into account the effect on the cognitive process, it can be assumed that the *structure and substance* of biology affect mental discipline. They contribute to a balanced intellectual development.

What is biology? Biology is essentially an adaptation of thought to reality (after Piaget, 1970) since we only know an object by "acting on" it and "transforming" it.

Thus, biology is not a copy of the environment but a system of real interactions reflecting the autoregulatory organization of life. Therefore Piaget maintains that the object of an act of knowing is never completely independent of the activities of the subject (learner). While objectivity is an ideal aimed at by every science, particularly by experimental science, such objectivity must nonetheless be subordinated to two conditions:

- (1) Objectivity refers to a *process* and not a state;
- (2) In all branches of advanced experimental science, the attainment of objectivity is achieved not by taking the object as it were, but by explaining it and, even at the early stages, describing it by means of a logico-mathematical framework (classification, interrelation, measurements, function, etc.) because outside this framework no cognitive assimilation is possible.

Piaget (1971) distinguishes three forms of biological knowledge that result from the exercise of the cognitive functions in man, that is (1) there is the vast category of biology acquired by means of *physical* experience of every type, that is, the experience of external objects as such; (2) it is of knowledge structured by *hereditary programming*, such as is the case with certain perceptual structures (seeing colours and dimensions in space); and (3) there is the category of *logico-mathematical* knowledge; it consists in enriching the object with characteristics or new relationships. Thus, it is these three types of action, and not only perceptions used for signalization, which constitute the sources of our scientific biological knowledge.


Thus *biology*, as a science, can be defined as: *the exploration of the material universe for the purpose of seeking orderly explanations of objects and events; these explanations, however, must be testable* (Brandwein, after Simpson, 1975). This definition shows that biology emphasizes investigation, searching for testable hypotheses of how nature works. A series of concepts in biology are interrelated in a fabric of ideas, known as *Substance*. James B Conant defines "substance" as a series of concepts or conceptual schemes arising out of experiment and observation and leading to new experiments and new observations (Brandwein, 1975). The substance in biology includes its processes, its products, its conceptual schemes and its tools.

On the other hand, *structure* in biology consists of what the teacher does and what he develops to aid his students in exploring nature. Structure includes *content* ordered in the form of concepts. Conant says that to learn "structure" is to learn how things are related (*ibid.*)

In Piaget's terms, biological knowledge is the result of a more impression made by the object on the sensory organs, but it is always dependent on active assimilation by the learner, who incorporates the objects into

his sensory motor schema. Piaget classifies science in the form of this series: mathematics \longrightarrow physics \longrightarrow biology \longrightarrow psychosociology. The two extremities tend to approach one another so that the series form a kind of circle as follows:

FIGURE 1. The true sense of the circle of science



Source: J. Piaget (1970) *Psychology and Epistemology*. p. 118

Mathematics, as a scientific discipline, uses to the *maximum* the activity of the learner, since this science is essentially deductive; and biology reduces to the *minimum* the activity of the learner, since it is essentially experimental.

Biology curricula require an application of the nature of biology, of child growth and development, and of the learning process. So a typical curriculum framework not only lists the subjects and topics to be covered, but also indicates a sequence of these topics. The principles of sequence usually begin with the simplest and the most concrete and proceed to the more complex and abstract. More describes the effectiveness of the well-planned sequences, suggesting that with the scientific planning of sequences for the development of concepts and reflective thinking, formal thinking can be developed much earlier than has been indicated by Piaget (Taba, 1962).

Other sequences have been used varying somewhat from subject to subject. The PPSP uses the principle of the "cumulative spiral" (Figure 2). Bruner supports a type of spiral design in the organization of what is learnt over the years of schooling. He argues that at each stage of schooling essentially the same content — skills as well as concepts and theories — is to be studied, but in different ways and at different levels of understanding.

Crittenden (1977) states that there are several key elements in Bruner's argument for a spiral curriculum. Two of them are (1) his interpretation of the broad pattern of cognitive development; and (2) that in the acquisition of knowledge and intellectual skill, the activities of learners at any age should be essentially the same as those who are working at the frontier of a discipline. His view is expressed succinctly in the slogan; "the school-

FIGURE 2.

The cumulative spiral syllabus at the PPSP School.

Level	Topic	Sub-topic
I	1. Heterogenity in living things 2. Body-structures	1. Animal classification in ponds 2. Sizes, shapes, and colors in living things
II	1. Heterogenity in living things 2. Body structures	1. Animal classification in farms and villages 2. Comparative sizes and shapes in living things
III	1. Heterogenity in living things 2. Body structures 3. Food	1. Animal classification in lakes and ricefields 2. Vertebrates 3. Obtaining food
IV	1. Continuity of life 2. Ecology	1. Life-cycles in domesticated plants and animals 2. Life in aquariums
V*	1. Continuity of life 2. Ecology	1. Life-cycles in wild animals and Plants 2. Life in ricefields

* Grade 5 of the PPSP primary school is equivalent to grade 6 of the traditional primary school.

Source: *Basic Course Outline*. Jakarta: BP3K. 1975

boy learning physics is a physicist". And Taba comments on the advantages of a spiral curriculum model as follows:

"Such a cumulative spiral should provide continual reinforcement by continuing in use that which has been acquired, either through practice or through use in the new context, such as a continuity between learning and applying ideas and skill.

There is no guarantee that anything learned at one time is acquired permanently, be it facts, ideas, skill, attitude or the power to think. Reinforcement, repetition, and continued use are usually needed" (Taba, 1962)

HOW IS BIOLOGY LEARNED?

A significant factor in developing a biological concept is the learner's background experience. It is dependent, in part, upon the cognitive history of the learner and upon previously assimilated concepts. But it is also greatly influenced by the teacher's conscious efforts to stimulate the concept formation. Hurd (1970) argues that possibly the most important factor of all is that the teacher himself has understood and internalized the concept.

The role of the teacher in concept formation in children, as Hurd states above, is not in line with several scholars' ideas on Bruner's hypothesis: "that any subject can be taught effectively in some intellectually honest form to any child". Beeby (1966) asks a vital question: "Can it be taught *by any teacher?*" And Piaget's answer to this hypothesis is in the form of two questions; (1) would it ever be possible to make the theory of relativity or even the simple handling of propositional or hypothetico-deductive operations comprehensible to a four year old child; and (2) why does a human baby not discover the continued presence of something that he sees you hide beneath a screen until he reaches the age of nine months and upward, whereas kittens do so at three months, even though they make no further progress in coordinating successive positions?

The power of a biological concept is increased when learning has been multicontextual. Therefore, an integrated biology curricula has a strong argument for exposing concepts as it provides a wider variety of context than is possible in a single sub-discipline — botany, zoology, and human science.

What retards concept formation? Piaget (1970) argues that retardation seems to have been due to the general characteristics of social interactions rather than to a deficiency in educative transmission. He maintains that the development of conceptual operations are determined by four factors: (1) *Biological factors*, that is, the development of brain and nerves. These factors do not intervene in the individuals cognitive evolution; (2) *Equilibration factors of action*, that is, the function of multiple activities in their aspects of exercise, experience, or action on the milieu; (3) *Social factors of individual coordination*, that is, social conduct of exchange among children or among children and adults, independent of the content of educative transmissions; and (4) *Factors of educative and cultural transmissions*.

Piaget states that concept structures develop in an invariant sequence. This means that the course of development is the same for all children, although the ages at which they progress may vary with intelligence and environment.

This Piagetian theory of concept development reminds us of the Lamarckian theory of organic evolution. Piaget states that Lamarckism still holds much interest for us even if it is no longer acceptable in its historical form, for in the English-speaking countries there is undoubtedly a revival of Lamarckian influence. He says that Lamarck was essentially a functionalist, and his emphasis on the unique formative role of environment reminds us of the epistemological empiricists. In spite of similarities, the Piagetian theory differs from the Lamarckian in the following aspects: (1) that an organism is less passive than Lamarck sup-

pose; it makes a positive reaction when it assimilates the environment to its structures instead of letting them give way in all directions through indeterminate accommodations; (2) Lamarck was forgetting the necessity for an internal organization which reacts actively and does not merely submit to external events; and (3) in Lamarck's case, environmental pressure is accepted, no more, no less, without being assimilated into a genotypic structure with which it might interact.

The Piagetian theory lies on the opposite end to John Locke's. For Locke, all knowledge comes from experience, the soul is a *tabula rasa*, the mind remains passive while receiving simple ideas. And the operations of the soul consist of combining these simple ideas without adding to them in any way.

DISCUSSION

1. Learning theories and the growth of biological concepts in children stated earlier are typical of Western ideas. They place a high social value on intellectual activity and pupil's autonomy of self-reward. The problem is whether the Western concept will successfully motivate the Indonesian pupil to learn or not, since the learning process seems to contradict the accepted values of the traditional society.

Many Western scholars warn us that introducing an innovation to a country quite different in its socio-cultural background cannot be taken for granted. Reference also shows that imported ideas fail to motivate the non-Western pupil to learn, since motivation is rooted in socio-cultural background. Furthermore, Western psychologists frame their theories with reference to conditions in an homogenous society, whilst conditions in Asia tend to be more heterogeneous.

In practice, my study uncovers that the Western idea of *modular biology* has succeeded in developing science concepts in primary school pupils, even in rural children. The research findings are:

- (1) pupils who learn biology by the modular instruction method develop biological concepts at a higher rate than those who learn by the traditional method;
- (2) In terms of the age levels of formal achievement, the delay in achieving science concepts among Indonesian children appears to be from 3 to 4 years, as compared with normal Western children (Seregeg, 1978)

While this research study will be valid in a limited area, owing to the limitations on equipment and the complexity of problems, warnings from several Western scholars must still be taken into our consideration.

- (a) Lovegrove and Gilbert (1972) warn us that there is, in a new era of teaching, a danger of the pedagogical pendulum swinging too far from the encyclopedic structure of traditional school science to an overemphasis on the process of science;
- (b) Beeby (1966) states that the split between theory and practice is widened by the great force with which educational goals and theories coming from economically advanced countries strike the ordinary practicing teacher in an emergent country, particularly if they are endorsed by his own educational hierarchy;
- (c) Myrdal (1968): "The use of Western theories, models, and concepts in the study of the economic problems in the South Asian countries is a cause of bias seriously distorting the study";
- (d) Furnival (1956): "Without fundamental changes in the economic environment and in the climate of popular opinion, the idea that Western ideas of material welfare can be taught in school is illusion".

The author argues that the key success of transferring Western concepts to a non-Western country lies on the teacher himself. He should be involved in any step of curriculum development and should be able to internalize the new teaching materials he is carrying out. Furthermore any new idea should be accompanied by quite detailed guides for class room practice.

2. In terms of the teaching-learning domain, the author argues: (1) that primary school biology should be approached from "function to structure" rather than the other way around. The general rule: one large function corresponding to a multiplicity of structures. For example, we can speak of the function of "breathing" and point out that it can be carried out by different organs which contain numerous structures, i.e.: gills, lungs, swimming bladder, etc. (2) Sequencingly, science courses should be arranged as follows: animals \longrightarrow plants \longrightarrow non-living things. The reasons are:

- (a) Children of the ages covered (4-10) are on the whole more actively and spontaneously interested in animals than in plants. The study of animal life develops more easily into cumulative knowledge and sustained pursuits than that of plant life, since moving and responsive things are the starting point of interest;
- (b) The "culture-epoch" theory believes that we can see a parallel between the child's growth and the successive type of culture in the history of people. According to this theory, all small boys are much more interested in farming and horses than in engines, motor-cars, and trains. (Issacs, 1963).
- (c) Biology education is an integral part of general education, that is, to educate people or children how to live as members of community.

Since the Indonesian peasants have moved toward "agricultural involution" (Geertz, 1968), biology courses at higher levels — secondary and tertiary — should be utilitarian and directed to the improvement of agriculture and health, whilst biology education at the primary level aims at investing in human beings.

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ETHNIC GROUPS OF INDONESIA

Parsudi SUPARLAN

INTRODUCTION

Studies on Indonesian ethnic groups, especially on inter-ethnic relations and ethnicity, have not yet received sufficient attention by Indonesians. Such studies are mostly done by foreign scholars (e.g. Bruner 1959, 1961, 1972, 1973, 1974; Cunningham 1958; Liddle 1970; Miles 1976; Skinner 1959; and others) and are well known among scholars in Indonesia as well as abroad. On the other hand, Indonesian scholars have done very few studies on these subjects (Dhofier 1976; Soehardi 1978; Suparlan 1972).

This neglect by Indonesian scholars is in part due to the "mystifying" government policy which prohibited discussions and study of ethnic groups (especially on ethnicity and inter-ethnic relations) during the fifties. The main reason, it was said, is that it is a sensitive matter which might disrupt Indonesian national integration. This policy has never been documented, but almost every government official, army official and Indonesian scholar is aware of its existence. Many Indonesian scholars believe that this policy is right, but when asked how such study has become a sensitive matter no one could give a satisfactory explanation.

What have we gained from such a policy for the development of social sciences in Indonesia and for our knowledge of Indonesian ethnic groups which is applicable for decision making policies for Indonesian development in general? Almost nothing. Because we don't really know what the social processes really are that are taking place in Indonesia today, especially the ones originating from and emerging out of inter-ethnic relations as expressed in the implementation of government development programs. Furthermore, the term ethnic group has become clouded as this term has been changed into "daerah" (area or territory) which usually refers to a certain Indonesian province. This has critical theoretical implications, since people living in a certain province do not always belong to a certain ethnic group.

This paper tries to shed light on this subject by describing Indonesian ethnic groups and their problems. This description involves some theoretical and methodological issues in areas where ethnic groups might play significant roles. It also intends to show that studies or discussions of ethnic groups and related subjects do not always produce sensitive or emotional matters. Similar to any subject or discussion in the scientific realm, this depends on the conceptual and theoretical frameworks used.

UNITY AND DIVERSITY

The Indonesian motto of *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* or Unity in Diversity does not only serve as a lip-service but it also reflects the actual reality of Indonesian society. Indonesia consists of more than three hundred ethnic groups, of which each maintains its own ethnic and cultural identity, yet they are all united under one Indonesian national government with an Indonesian national culture.

The present number of ethnic groups in Indonesia is not precisely known, because the Indonesian government does not ask information on ethnic groups in the census questionnaires. The only recent data available about Indonesian ethnic groups comes from the Census of 1930. Table I presents Raymond Kennedy's classification of the ethnic groups in Indonesia (except those of Irian Jaya). The figures in Table I approximate those of the Census of 1930 in which the total population is 60 million.

TABLE I

ETHNIC GROUPS OF INDONESIA

	Population
I. Sumatra and adjacent islands	8,000,000
1. Acehnese	750,000
2. Gayo-Alas	50,000
3. Batak (including Karo, Mandailing; Toba, Pakpak, Timur)	1,000,000
4. Minangkabau	2,000,000
5. Coastal Malays	3,500,000
6. Rejang — Lebong (including Lampong group, Lebong, Pasemah, Rawas, Rejang, Semendo)	500,000
7. Kubu group (including Akit, Kubu, Benua, Lubu, Mamak, Rawas, Sakai, Talang, Tapung, Ulu, Utan)	25,000
8. Niassans	200,000
9. Mentawaians	10,000
10. Engganese	300
11. Orang Laut	10,000
II. Kalimantan (Borneo)	2,500,000
1. Bahau Group (including Kayan, Kenya, Long Glar, Long Wai, Kinjin, Pniling, Saputan, Segai, Tring, Uma Pagong, Uma Suling)	300,000

TABLE 1 (Continued)

ETHNIC GROUPS OF INDONESIA		Population
2.	Ngaju Group (including Biadju, Bukit, Dusun, Kahayan, Katingan, Kotawaringin, Lawangan, Maanyan, Murung, Ot Danum, Patai, Saruyan, Siang, Siong, Tabuyan, Taman Tamoan)	400,000
3.	Land Dyak Group (including Ayau, Bukar, Desa, Lundu, Manyukei, Mualang, Sidin)	200,000
4.	Klemantan-Murut-Kelabit Group (including Adang, Batu Belah, Bisaya, Dusun, Kadayan, Kelabit, Kanowit, Long Kiput, Milanau, Murik, Murut, Saban, Sebop, Tagal, Tidong, Tingalan, Treng)	300,000
5.	Iban Group	200,000
6.	Punan Group (including Aput, Basap, Boh, Bukat, Bukitan, Busang, Kelai, Lisum, Lugat, Ot, Penyabong)	50,000
7.	Coastal Malays, Buginese, Banjarese, etc	1,000,000
III.	Java and Madura	40,000,000
1.	Javanese	27,000,000
2.	Sundanese	8,500,000
3.	Madurese	4,500,000
4.	Badui	1,200
5.	Tenggerese	10,000
IV.	Sulawesi (Celebes) and adjacent islands	4,000,000
1.	Macassarese — Buginese	2,500,000
2.	Toraja Group (including Ampa, Bada Baku, Banasu, Besoa, Buyu, Gimpu, Kadombuku, Kulawi, Lage, Lalaeo, Lampu, Leboni Lindu, Muto, Napu, Onda'e, Pada, Pakambia, Pakawa, Palu, Parigi, Pebato, Poso, Pu'u mBoto, Rampi, Rato, Salu Maoge, Sigi, Tawaelia, Tojo, Toli-toli)	200,000
3.	Sadang Group (including Mamasa, Mamuju, Mangki, Masen-Reinpulu, Pada, Rongkong, Sadang, Seko)	500,000
4.	Mori-Laki Group (including Bela, Bungku, Butonese, Kabaena, Kinadu, Laki, Lambatu, Maronene, Matano, Mekongga, Mori, Mowewe, Muna, Tambe'e, Wanji, Wawoni)	200,000
5.	Loinang Group (including Belanta, Banggai Bobongko, Loinang, Saluan, Wana)	100,000
6.	Minahasa Group (including Bantik, Bolaang-Mongondow, Bentanan, Bulang, Buolese, Gorotalese, Nanusa, Ponosokan, Sangir, Talaud, Tolour, Tombulu, Tompakewa, Tondano, Tonsawang, Tonsea, Tonsini, Tontemboan)	500,000
7.	Toala	100
V.	Nusa Tenggara (Lesser Sunda Islands)	3,500,000
1.	Bali (Balinese, Bali Agha)	1,200,000
2.	Lombok (Balinese, Bodha, Sasak)	600,000
3.	Sumbawa (Bimanese, Do-Donggo, Dompou, Sanggau, Sumbawanese)	300,000
4.	Sumba	100,000
5.	Savu	27,000
6.	Roti	60,000
7.	Timor (including Atoni, Belu, Kupangese)	700,000

TABLE 1 (Continued)

ETHNIC GROUPS OF INDONESIA	
	Population
8. Flores (including Ende, Larantuka, Ngada, Manggarai, Sikka)	500,000
9. Alor-Solor islands (including Adonara, Alor, Lomblem, Pantar, Solor)	150,000
VI. Maluku (Moluccas)	425,000
1. Southwestern Islands (including Wetar, Kisar, Leti-Lakor-Moa-Luang-Sermata, Roma-Damar)	39,500
2. Southeastern Islands (including Babar, Nila-Teun-Serua)	13,000
3. Tanimbar Islands	25,000
4. Kei Islands	30,000
5. Aru Islands (including Arunese, Gungai, Tungu)	20,000
6. Banda Islands	6,000
7. Ambon Islands	60,000
8. Ceram (including Bonfia, Pattalima, Pattasiwa Hitam, Pattasiwa Putih, Seti)	60,000
9. Ceramlaut-Goram-Watubola	14,500
10. Buru	20,000
11. Halmahera (including Galela, Tobaru, Tobelo)	50,000
12. Ternate-Tidore	35,000
13. Bacan Islands	10,000
14. Obi Islands	—
15. Sula Islands	15,000

Source: Kennedy (1942: 23-26)

The striking feature of the population of the Indonesian ethnic groups is their variation in size, i.e. from 100 Toala of Sulawesi to 27,000,000 Javanese (in 1930). If we arbitrarily define a large ethnic group as one with a population of 1,000,000 or over in 1930, we will single out eight large Indonesian ethnic groups with a number of 51,200,000 peoples or about 85 percent of the population (see Table II).

TABLE II

MAJOR ETHNIC GROUPS OF INDONESIA (Based on 1930 Census)

	Population (in thousands)	Per Cent of Total Population
1. Javanese	27,000	45.0
2. Sundanese	8,500	14.2
3. Madurese	4,500	7.5
4. Coastal Malays (Sumatra and Kalimantan)	4,500	7.5
5. Macassarese — Buginese	2,500	4.2
6. Minangkabau	2,000	3.3
7. Balinese	1,200	2.0
8. Batak	1,000	1.7
Totals	51,200	85.4

Source: Kennedy (1942: 23-26)

The great range of population sizes of the Indonesian ethnic groups is accompanied by great variation of their cultures. These phenomena seem to cause difficulties in defining Indonesian ethnic groups as shown in the Census of 1930. The first difficulty comes from the criteria used in classification, and the lack of correspondence between possible criteria.

In the 1930 Census the criteria used for classification is "language spoken, customs and habits" (Netherlands Indies 1936: 44), but on the same page it is also stated that race is used to classify peoples of the Outer islands. Further, in the Census of 1930 we also find the use of geographical and residual categories, along with the use of language and culture to define an ethnic group. Thus the Javanese (a language and cultural group); the Kubu group (a residual category of or all the diverse aboriginals of Sumatra); the Mentawai and the Sumba (an island), are all used to define ethnic groups.

Difficulties are also caused by the fact that there is insufficient data about the Indonesian peoples themselves, especially from the Eastern parts of Indonesia. These difficulties originated among other things from the atomistic character of some of the Indonesian communities, which lack higher levels of political integration. The Toraja group, for example, with a population of 200,000 (in 1930) is divided into more than 30 sub-groups (and each group is identified as an ethnic group). It is a striking contrast if we compare them with the Javanese with a population of 27,000,000 which is not divided into sub-groups¹.

Ethnic groups in Indonesia are basically homogeneous groups with their own cultural identity and with their own territorial boundaries, located in diverse places scattered all over what is now Indonesia. In its homeland, the local ethnic culture is the dominant one, which functions as a set of reference systems to selectively guide people's actions in their everyday activities and in their ways of perceiving the world around them of which they are a part.

Only in the cities and in urban centers can we find a mixture of different ethnic groups. They are mostly government officials, army, traders, students, and job-seekers. It is in the cities and in urban centers that the expression of the Indonesian national culture is apparent, i.e. especially at the official level of interactions in offices, schools and universities, and during national events. The Indonesian national culture is expressed through the use of Indonesian language and symbols, and mannerisms, which are not ethnic and are claimed to be Indonesian.

¹ See also Geertz, 1967

Despite the fact that government offices, schools and universities are arenas where the expressions of Indonesian national culture are apparent, it doesn't mean that within these arenas there is not any expression of ethnic culture. In fact, government officials, students, teachers, and professors interact with each other in the national sphere of interaction only in official relationships, but interact with each other either by using ethnic culture or local culture. However, the use of ethnic symbols and culture is more apparent in the spheres outside the official relationships.

The national culture ties members of different ethnic groups in Indonesia together, while members of ethnic groups maintain their own ethnic and cultural identity. This derives from the fact that every Indonesian is not just an Indonesian but he is also a member of a certain ethnic group. One's ascription to an ethnic identity and acquirement of an ethnic culture is one's most basic identity and culture because he was born and raised within it before he encountered the Indonesian national culture in schools, and other Indonesian national cultural spheres.²

His awareness that he is an Indonesian is tailed by his ascription of Indonesian language and symbols and mannerisms. Problems that he faces then, are not just how to become Indonesian but also how to become a member of an ethnic group of his own in his social relationships that he encounters with members of his own and other ethnic groups, especially in the city and urban centers.

When an Indonesian in the city asks himself or is asked by other Indonesian, "Who am I?" or "Who is he?" one of the answers will refer to one of the ethnic groups, e.g. "I am Javanese", "I am Sundanese", "I am Batak", etc. Indonesians are well aware of their ethnic and cultural identity. However, it must be kept in mind that this awareness is emerging in social interactions, i.e. depending upon who he encounters, where the relationship takes place, and what the subject being discussed is.

Thus, when an Indonesian is asked about his ethnic identity by another Indonesian, of the same ethnic group, he will refer to a certain locality of the territorial area of that ethnic group.³ The same is also the case when the question is asked in any place within the boundary of the territory of a certain ethnic group, where the person questioned belongs to that certain ethnic group, as the answer will always refer to a certain locality.

2 I have used a model of cultural pluralism as developed by Depres (1968) and theories on ethnic relationships developed by Barth (1969), Bruner (1974) and by Lehman (1967) in reconstructing a pluralistic model that can be used to understand and to analyze the present Indonesian society.

3 See. P. Suparlan, 1972

Members of a certain ethnic group who live in the rural areas will most likely have social relationships with members of their own ethnic group. Those who live in the cities and urban centers have the chance of meeting members of different ethnic groups. However, it will happen only if their social interactions are not limited to their own ethnic networks. Whenever they meet someone new, they will learn to identify this unknown individual as being a member of one or another ethnic group by using selective indicators of ethnic identification that they know from their previous contacts and communications with others.

Among those ethnic groups that Indonesians are fairly certain to know would be individuals who belong to major ethnic groups (see Table II) and those who have migrated or have long historical migration to the cities. Among these are Javanese, Sundanese, Madurese, Batak, Ambonese, Acehnese, Manadonese, Macassarrese or Buginese, Minangkabau, and Malays. It is important to note here that the Coastal Malays (an ethnic category listed in the 1930 Census) are known and identified by Indonesians by the specific area where they came from, e.g. Medan, Sumatra Timur, Kalimantan Barat, etc.

Thus, it is possible that the average Indonesian in Jakarta would meet and make acquaintance with someone of Aceh, Batak, Lombok, Timor, or any other person from any other of the smaller islands. But it is also possible that he would never meet with someone from any other place in Indonesia, such as Toraja, Bali, Mentawai, Dayak, etc. However, lack of contact should not be equated with lack of awareness. For, although he might never meet with a Toraja and thus have the belief that the Toraja are exotic people living with their traditional culture as expressed in their extravagant burial ceremony, things which are not objectively true, at least he has the awareness that there is a Toraja distinct from other ethnic groups because of their culture.

Cultural differences among Indonesians can be drawn based on ethnic lines, as one is born and lives within its spheres and boundaries, and there are many readily observable indicators that Indonesians can use to identify one's ethnic affiliation. Those are a person's name or surname, the particular pronunciation of his bahasa Indonesia (Indonesian language) which expresses the phonetic system of his ethnic language, native dress in which each ethnic group has its preference to styles and color, food preferences, musical styles, and forms of artistic expressions.

At a deeper level and more difficult to detect, each ethnic group is characterized by distinctive mannerisms, body gestures, and styles of behavior. There is still another observable indicator which many Indonesians frequently use to identify the other's ethnic affiliation — that is physical characteristics.

Ability to identify an individual as belonging to a certain ethnic group and also to differentiate fellow Indonesians from foreigners is an indication of shared common knowledge Indonesians have about each other. This shared common knowledge is the basis of the unity of their cultural identity, as communication flows are made possible and exchange of symbols and ideas of different ethnic culture are not unknown or uncommon among themselves.

It is no wonder that those who have studied Indonesian society and cultures are faced by the fact that despite linguistic, racial, and cultural diversity there is a fundamental similarity, a common characteristics which appear in all or most of the ethnic groups which lies beyond the Indonesian national culture. The characteristic of the Indonesian society and cultures as that of Unity and Diversity was identified earlier by Kennedy.⁴ Possibly the basis of these similarities have come from the fact that all the native languages of the Indonesian ethnic groups belong to Malayo-Polynesian stock, except a few ethnic groups in Eastern parts of Indonesia. Further, the using of the Malay language (*bahasa Melayu*) as a *lingua franca* (especially in the coastal areas) is not uncommon for members of different ethnic groups with unintelligible languages.

Cultural diversity in Indonesia can also be seen by using indicators which the Indonesian themselves are aware of. These are religious belief system, economic system, education, the structure of the community, and political orientation.⁵ Any of these indicators (or all of them) have become a part of the ethnic culture and is one of the references for one's ethnic identification. But on the other hand, in some cases, a certain indicator, a religion for example, is not only an element of a certain ethnic culture but also an element of the cultures of several ethnic groups. Thus, this creates a situation in which ethnic boundaries disappear in the religious sphere for members of different ethnic groups but of the same religious persuasion.

As shown in Table III, the religion of the majority of Indonesians is Islam. Second to Islam is Christianity (Protestants, Catholics, and other Sects), followed by Hinduism, Paganism (ancestor worship, animism, and other beliefs in supernatural power) listed in Table III as Others, Buddhism, and Konghucuism. Most Indonesians are well aware of the fact that Islam is the religion of the Javanese, Sundanese, Minangkabau, Acehnese, Macassarese, Buginese, the Malays, and the Madurese (although it is not listed in Table III). The awareness is only that Islam is the religion of the majority of the people in these groups. This has come

⁴ See R. Kennedy, 1937

⁵ See Geertz, 1968

TABLE III

RELIGIONS OF INDONESIA

Religion	Population	Percentage
Islam	103,580,000	87.5
Catholic Christians	2,692,000	2.3
Protestant Christians	5,152,000	4.4
Other Christians	898,000	0.8
Hindu	2,296,000	1.9
Budha	1,092,000	0.9
Konghucu	972,000	0.8
Others	1,686,000	1.4
Totals	118,368,000	100.0

Source: Census 1971

from the fact that there are Javanese, Sundanese, Minangkabau, Aceh-nese, Macassarese-Buginese, the Malays, and Madurese who are not Islam.

Further, those who are Islam among the Javanese are still divided into the *santri* and the *abangan*, as two categories of their being Islam.⁶ Categories of *santri* and *abangan* are not found only among the Javanese but also among other ethnic groups as well. Thus, a Javanese *santri* will be more agreeable to a Sundanese *santri* than to a Sundanese *abangan* in a religious sphere of interaction, and vice versa.

The possession of common characteristics which followed by social solidarity among the same categories (religious category for example) of different ethnic groups, on the one hand causes the weakening of ethnic boundaries and creates complexities of ethnic identification and culture, and on the other hand reduces ethnic solidarity which then operates only within smaller units or categories. This becomes more complex as other indicators play the same role in strengthening and weakening ethnic ties among members of the same ethnic group, and strengthening solidarity among members of different ethnic groups and in dividing an ethnic group into smaller units or categories.

How did cultural diversity in Indonesia arise? Some scholars have tried to reconstruct available data to explain this phenomena. One of the explanations is by using a theory of migration⁷ in which the racial, linguistic and cultural diversity are correlated as one property of migration which came into Indonesia in the past in waves.

6 See C. Geertz, 1960

7 See R. Kennedy, 1937; F.C. Cole, 1945; R. Heine-Geldern, 1945

According to this theory there were several waves of migration, each with its own racial, linguistic and cultural types different from the others. Those are the migrations of the Negrito-Veddoid, the Melanesian-Australoid and the Malay types. The first waves of migration consisted of the peoples of Negrito-Veddoid physical type, followed by the Melanesian-Australoid physical type, and the Malay type.

The Negrito-Veddoid were peoples with a hunting-gathering culture who formerly occupied a widespread area of Southeast Asia and Indonesia, but were driven away by new comers into the jungles and mountains in isolated places, or into the far eastern parts of Indonesian islands. Basically the Negrito and the Veddoid are two separate categories, but there are not any intact Negrito or Veddoid communities in Indonesia. Instead, some communities consist of peoples with traces of physical types identified as those of the Negrito and the Veddoid physical characteristics which appear in the same person. Traces of Negrito-Veddoid physical characteristics have identified in the Orang Laut, the Toala, Muna and Laki of the Mori-Laki Group, some Loinang groups of Sulawesi, the Kubu of Sumatra, Ot Danum of Central Kalimantan, and the Bonfia of Eastern Ceram.

The Melanesian-Australid, sometimes called Papuan or Austromelanesian, came to Indonesian islands sometime later but they were driven away to the eastern parts of Indonesia. They had the same culture as that of the Negrito-Veddoid, i.e. a hunting gathering culture. Physically they differ from that of the Negrito-Veddoid in that they are taller. At present they are found in Irian Jaya, parts of the eastern Maluku (Moluccas), and in the Flores-Timor area.

The type of Malays who migrated into the archipelago has been identified as that of the Proto and the Deutro Malays. Malayo-Polynesian speaking peoples of Proto Malay physical type with Neolithic culture brought agriculture to Indonesia.⁸ This was followed by waves of the migration of Deutro Malay who came to Indonesia introducing wet rice agriculture. The difference between the Proto and the Deutro Malays is that the first one has more Caucasoid features while the second one has more Mongoloid features. Further, the Deutro Malays are identified as having a higher frequency of people with round heads, straight hair, prominent cheekbones and epicanthic eye fold. Peoples inhabiting the islands off Sumatra's West Coast (Mentawai, Nias, Enggano), some of the Orang Laut, Batak, Gayo-Alas, the Rejang-Lampung Group, the Dayaks of Kalimantan, most peoples of the interior Sulawesi, the Tenggerese and the Badui of Java are the Proto Malays. The Deutro Malays are found

8 See R. Linton, 1955, p. 177

among the Acehnese, Macassarese-Buginese, Balinese, and the Sasak of Lombok.⁹

The migration theory is itself questionable; as the persistent association of racial characteristics, the non-diffusion and the non-borrowing processes of cultural traits, and ignoring the possibility of local independent development are contrary to all findings of modern social anthropology. How then can we explain the similarities and differences among the ethnic groups of Indonesia?

First, we have to account for the migrations in the past as factors in diffusing racial and cultural characteristics and in stimulating the emergence of acculturation and the local independent development. Secondly, we must account for the differential contacts between the local peoples with foreign cultures. All of these might explain the existing four types of culture based upon their degree of economic development.¹⁰

The first type is the one with a hunting and gathering economy. People living with this culture are organized in nomadic bands hunting games and collecting forest products in a well defined territorial area of the jungle. There is neither agriculture, metal tools, ceramics, nor weaving. Examples of this type were the Toala, the Kubu Group, and the Punan. Most of them have now adopted sedentary agriculture, or a combination of sedentary agriculture with hunting and gathering economic activities.

The second type is characterized by dry rice growing economy. They lack any political domain above the village level. They are also characterized as being non-Islamic peoples. Examples of them are the Badui, Tenggerese, the Dayaks of Kalimantan, the Toraja and other smaller groups of Sulawesi, and the Mentawaians.

The third type is characterized by the complexities of the culture, i.e. artificial irrigation, intensive wet rice agriculture, considerable Hindu acculturation, a written literature, religion of the great tradition (mostly Islam except for the Balinese and Batak), and in the past a social stratification with a noble class (except the Batak and the Minangkabau) which ruled the native states. The ethnic groups which belong to this type are the Javanese, Sundanese, Madurese, Acehnese, the Malays of Sumatra, Minangkabau, Macassarese-Buginese, Balinese, and Batak.

9 See R. Kennedy, 1943

10 Clifford Geertz (1963) identifies the existence of two types of cultures in Indonesia based on their difference in ecosystems. These are the inner island (Java) and the outer islands. On the other hand, Hildred Geertz (1963) has classified Indonesian cultures into three categories, i.e., the wet-rice growers of inland Java and Bali, the Islamic coastal peoples, and the tribal groups.

The fourth type is the one found in the urban centers. This is characterized by the complexities and refinements of the ethnic cultures as they were the centers of the ethnic social and cultural systems, differing from the cultures of the rural areas. They are mostly found in the coastal areas of the third type of culture (see above), but some are also found in the inland (Java) and are not under the control of any ethnic state or kingdom (Jakarta).

Indonesian communities have had a long series of contacts with various foreign cultures, i.e., from China, India, Islam, Europeans and the Dutch. As contacts between foreign cultures and local communities have taken place unevenly, the influences of foreign cultures upon the cultures of local communities and ethnic groups and the emerging forms of cultural acculturation vary. Cultural contacts are most extensive in the favorable areas, i.e. along the coast and in areas which are rich with exportable natural resources. Most of these are occupied by the Javanese, Sundanese, Madurese, Macassarese-Buginese, Acehnese, and the Malays. Among these areas, the island of Java has been the one with the most foreign cultural influences.

In Java the traces of Chinese, Hindu, Islam and European (especially the Dutch) cultural influences are found here and there. These are either in the forms of material cultures and symbols or in the forms of cultural elements found in deeper and more subtle level of the Javanese culture. The present relatively advanced level of cultural development of Java is probably the result of extensive culture contact and borrowing, combined with its large population and its fertile soil with rich natural resources.

Among the contacts between the Indonesian ethnic groups with foreign cultures, the one with the Chinese has a special place in Indonesia. Many Chinese have migrated and lived in Indonesia, and are still arriving continuously from China and from other countries of Southeast Asia. In comparison with other foreign immigrants, the number of the

TABLE IV

DISTRIBUTION OF THE CHINESE POPULATION

	Chinese Population	Total Population	Per cent Chinese of total
Java and Madura	1,230,000	63,059,000	2.0
Sumatra	690,000	15,739,000	4.4
Kalimantan	370,000	4,102,000	9.0
East Indonesia	160,000	13,427,000	1.2
Totals	2,450,000	96,327,000	2.5

Source: Skinner (1963:99)

Chinese is the largest. They constitute 2,5% (1961) of the total population of Indonesia (see Tables IV and V).

TABLE V

GROWTH OF THE CHINESE POPULATION IN INDONESIA (in thousands).					
Year	Java	Sumatra	West Kalimantan	Other	Total
1860	150	—	—	—	150
1880	207	94	28	15	344
1895	258	159	38	17	470
1905	295	195	48	25	563
1920	384	304	68	54	810
1930	582	449	108	94	1,233
1956	1,145	605	271	179	2,200
1961	1,230	690	315	215	2,450

Source: Skinner (1963: 100)

There have been centuries of cultural contacts between the Chinese and the local natives of Indonesia, and traces of Chinese cultural elements in local ethnic cultures are found here and there. Inter-marriages between Chinese and local natives (male Chinese and female native) are not uncommon, and can be traced back through history. Yet, over centuries the category 'Chinese' remains a distinct social category in Indonesia.

They are separated from the category of the natives because of their language, customs, religion, and habits, which become more apparent through their cultural and economic superiority in inter-ethnic relationships. Their superiority can be maintained through their ability to dominate certain levels of structures within the Indonesian economic system. This seems to be the reason for their special place in Indonesian society, in which they tend to maintain their own ethnic and cultural identity implicated by their feeling of economic superiority. This tendency is also strengthened by the fact that new Chinese migrants came to Indonesia from time to time, which has been going on for centuries, and has created the present separateness between the Chinese and the Indonesian natives.

The present Indonesians categorize the Chinese as non-native (*non-pribumi*), which means that although many of the Chinese are locally born, they are not one of the ethnic groups of Indonesia. They are non-native, in a sense that they could be Indonesian citizens (it is difficult for the average Indonesians to differentiate between those of Indonesian and those of foreign citizens) but they are not native to Indonesia. Thus they are different from members of Indonesian ethnic groups.

INTER-ETHNIC RELATIONS

In social interactions actors act as they expect to be judged and treated by others, consciously and unconsciously, by launching selective symbols which are available to them. These symbols are a combination of a set of motives and abstract values. Symbols which are usually manipulated by actors include costumes, verbal and non-verbal behavior.

Symbols which are expressed in social interactions derive from the rules and categories of one's cultural knowledge. The wider the social network of a person, which includes those of other ethnic and cultural identities, the wider the horizon of his cultural knowledge is. Thus, in this case, the rules and the categories of that person's cultural knowledge do not only include those of his own ethnic culture but consist of cultural knowledge of other ethnic groups and categories as well.

Culture can be defined as a set of knowledge used by man to interpret and to generate meaningful behavior in his adaptation to environments. It consists of a set of cognitive models functioning as a set of reference systems which are selectively used to interpret and to guide people's actions in everyday activities.

Knowledge about the environment consists, among other things, of knowledge about categories of people, situations and places, and certain rules for using certain symbols so that they are appropriately expressed in social interactions. Knowledge about people is labelled as stereotypes, which consist of a set of labels of attributes that a person has about a certain category of person. Stereotypes about a certain category of person emerge from social interactions with the concerned person but also from information a person can get from another social interaction.

In a plural society, such as Indonesia, in which the society consists of diverse ethnic and cultural groupings, Indonesians have a rich number of stereotypes about each other. This is because awareness about each other as coded in one's cultural knowledge is expressed in terms of ethnic stereotypes. The richly labelled attributes of stereotypes are usually found among Indonesians in the cities and urban centers, because in these social arenas they have more contacts with members of other groups than those who live in rural areas.

However, such stereotypes are not always accepted by other parties, as each ethnic group perceives and evaluates others by using its own cultural values. For example, the Javanese see themselves, in comparison to others, as restrained, polite, refined, and able to control their emotions. They say that other ethnic groups are rude, coarse, talk too loudly, are aggressive, get angry easily, and so on. But on the other hand, members

of other ethnic groups may say that Javanese are stupid, slow, and untrustworthy as it is hard to really know what the Javanese mean when they say "yes" when others ask whether they agree or not about something.

In reality, a stereotype that a person holds about another person of a different ethnic group is not necessarily expressed in symbols in the actual social relationship between them. It is because that person does not only rely upon that ethnic stereotype he has in order to judge the other person and to guide his behavior, but he has also to rely upon other stereotypes as parts of his cognitive models to be able to judge properly the place and the situation within which the social interactions occur, and the motives they encounter in such situations. In that case, if the situation or if the motives they encounter in such situations do not stimulate ethnic stereotypes for judging or generating ethnic symbols to be expressed, he has to use other appropriate cognitive models, and not the ethnic stereotypes, to interpret the environment he encounters and to generate his behavior appropriately in responding to that environment.

In his study on the expression of ethnicity in Indonesia, Bruner has shown the importance of taking account of several factors which are determinants of the behavior of the different ethnic groups in social interactions.¹¹ He sees behavior as a response to patterns of interaction and communication among groups. The importance of patterns of interaction is shown by his thesis, in which it is stated that the patterns of the expressions of ethnicity is determined by the urban structure. The nature of urban structure is determined by the absence or presence of a dominant majority culture, and consists of three components, i.e. the social demography, the established local culture, and the locus of power.¹²

The presence of a dominant culture within an urban structure will result in the fact that "the standards of appropriate behavior in public places, and most urban institutions, are controlled by the majority of the local population and are operated in their culture patterns" The case in point is that of the urban structure in Bandung. On the other hand, Bruner sees that Medan is a city with no dominant culture.

In comparing these two, Bruner shows that the behavior of the ethnic migrants in public places is adapted to the Sundanese culture pattern of Bandung. On the other hand, in Medan every ethnic group is an ethnic minority and each maintains its own culture pattern as expressed in its ethnic sphere and in public places.

¹¹ See E.M. Bruner, 1974

¹² See E.M. Brunner, 1974 p. 255

Thus, social interactions are defined by the sphere in which interactions take place, by the categories involved in the social interactions, and by the motives of the concerned actors involved. In his analysis of the pattern of social interactions on plural societies, Despres has proposed three spheres that must be taken into account, that is the national, public or market place, and ethnic spheres.¹³ It seems to me that Despres's proposition is in the same line as that of Bruner's, and possibly will be fruitful if the combination of the two can be used for understanding the inter-group behavior among different categories of Indonesians in actual social relationships.

Interactions within the ethnic sphere are characterized by the using of ethnic culture and symbols. These mostly have their basis in the social and cultural activities of the family, kinship, and other such rituals. Usually, in such social interactions, non-kinship or non ethnic members are excluded from participation.

As ethnic group is seen as a social category, categorization and groupings based on ethnic culture do occur and can become the basis of interactions among ethnic members in an ethnic sphere. In daily activities, interactions between members of the same ethnic group but of different social categories or groupings are mostly defined in terms of ethnic culture. An example of this is a social relationship between a *wong cilik* (a Javanese commoner) and a *priyayi* (a Javanese aristocrat) in which the *wong cilik* is a peasant working for the *priyayi*. Social interactions between them will be defined in terms of the Javanese culture in which certain honors are paid by the peasant to show his lowliness as expressed in verbal and non-verbal behavior, while the *priyayi* has to acknowledge this as a response by using certain appropriate symbols.

The example above is only one expression of situation and motives which fit the expected behavior. Other possibilities are that the peasant and the *priyayi* are relating to each other in a court in which the central focus of their interactions is on a legal matter concerning a piece of land (which happens frequently in Java). Social interactions in this situation is then not to be defined in terms of ethnic culture but in terms of the Indonesian national culture, and all of the rules and symbols expressed in this arena are Indonesian symbols and the behavior expressed is formal in character. The Indonesian national culture is characterized by its formal character, in that it stresses the formality of behavior of the concerned actors. Probably this is due to its original function in guiding social relationships at the official level among officials.

13 See L. Despres, 1968

Interactions occurring within the national sphere are characterized by the using of the Indonesian national symbols, such as *Bahasa Indonesia*, idioms and gestures, and mannerisms which neither belong to the ethnic culture nor the public culture. As it stresses formality, interactions of this type usually disregard the ethnic and cultural backgrounds of the actors, and appear in arenas such as office, school and university, and in such other situations defined as those of the national events. Role relations, in accordance with the official statuses of the concerned actors, are significant in defining the features of such interactions. As offices, schools and universities are mostly found in the cities and urban centers, the frequency of occurring social interactions as defined in terms of national culture is more apparent in the cities and in urban centers.

Another example of the possible relationship between the peasant and the *priyayi* is that they relate to each other as buyer and seller in the market. Suppose the *priyayi* is a small shop owner who is selling groceries (as is now happening among many of the Javanese *priyayi*), the social interactions between him and the peasant who comes to buy some goods then is not defined in terms of *priyayi-wong cilik* relationship but between seller and buyer. Symbols expressed in behavior are then those of the market sphere (or public sphere) and not those of the Javanese ethnic sphere.

Questions concerning what is the public or the market sphere and what is the ethnic sphere may have to be explained through understanding each of the ethnic cultures and where the interactions take place. Take for example the Javanese culture. Its social structure is characterized by the importance of strata and locality.¹⁴ Thus, every Javanese has a place in a certain social stratum which is hierarchically ordered, and by understanding his own and other's positions in a certain stratum enables him to interact with others properly in accordance with the Javanese culture as expressed in symbols. An example of this has been shown earlier in this chapter.

But every Javanese is also identified by other Javanese as belonging to a certain locality, which bears its own cultural identity and traditions. Traditionally, locality is identified hierarchically in terms of center and peripheral areas in accordance with the Javanese notion of kingdom as a microcosm of the universe. Thus, the closer a certain locality is to the center of a kingdom the higher is the position of that locality and its inhabitants in relation to other localities of the same order. The highest of all is that of the center of the kingdom, and the lowest is that of the farthest locality from the center of the kingdom.

¹⁴ See P Suparlan, 1972

In the past, peoples of Yogyakarta for example, tended to identify themselves and were identified by others as having a higher social status than that of the people from Banyumas or other such peripheral localities. This is because Yogyakarta is the center of the Javanese kingdom and is considered to be the center of the Javanese civilization. Another distinction made by the Javanese which is also based on locality, that is urban-rural distinction. This is also differentiated hierarchically starting from village at the bottom level to small town, and at the top level is the city where the palace or the capital of the kingdom is located.

If interactions among the Javanese are defined in ethnic terms, these are characterized by the use of strata traditionally defined. But if the interactions are defined in public terms, the use of traditional strata disappears. The second case usually occurs among people who do not know each other and happens in public places which involves peoples of different localities.

There are several types of public places in Indonesia. These are a small town, a town, a provincial city, and Jakarta, the capital of Indonesia. If in a small town the number of public places and the categories of people involved in social interactions is limited, the larger the town or urban center the more the number of public places and the categories of people involved in social interactions within them.

If in a small town those who interact in public places are limited to a certain locality, in town these are a number of different categories of people originating from different localities but of the same ethnic origins. In the city in a province there are not only members of different localities but also members of different Indonesian ethnic groups and possibly a few foreigners. In Jakarta members of almost all Indonesian ethnic groups are represented and foreigners also add to the complexities of the public places. As shown by Bruner¹⁵, there are cities in which a local ethnic culture is dominant and thus defines the rules for appropriate behavior in its public places; but there also cities where there is no such local dominant ethnic culture and thus the ethnic groups in the city have to define appropriate behavior according to their adaptation to each other and to the environment of the city.

Inter-ethnic relations usually take place in public places, although in offices, schools and universities they are not uncommon — but they are not formal ones. Jokes about each other are not uncommon in inter-ethnic relations, but conflicts rarely occur just because of deriding ethnic jokes. It is one of the features of Indonesian society, in which social order is maintained in public places despite the fact that members of different

¹⁵ See E.M. Brunner, 1974

ethnic groups interact with each other, and each of them is aware of the other's ethnic and cultural identity. It is apparent that they have the ability to adapt to the rules of the game of a certain public place which they are involved in. It seems to be the case that ethnic and cultural differences are not the source of conflicts. But one's ethnic and cultural identity can be manipulated to strengthen ethnic awareness and solidarity among its members for certain goals in their competition with members of other ethnic and cultural groupings, as will be discussed below.

Conflicts between members of different ethnic groups do occur when competition for resources and position is accelerated. Such conflict can be expanded by the concerned actors by involving members of the same ethnic category against members of other ethnic categories. In the past, ethnic conflicts were observed in some Indonesian cities. In 1962 there was a fight between a Macassarese of Sulawesi and a Bantenese of West Java in Tanjung Priuk of Jakarta. This fight was followed by sporadic fights between those two ethnic groups, in which several people were killed. Apparently the fight started from the competition between members of those two ethnic groups for the control over jobs and resources in the harbor.

Another fight was between the Batak of North Sumatra and the *becak* drivers who are mostly Sundanese and Javanese, in Bandung, in 1969. From sources I later heard that apparently this fight had started from competition in the market over the control of the rice market. A similar case with the same basic motive but with a different reason also occurred in Jakarta in 1968 and 1971 between the Batak and the *becak* drivers. This began when a *becak* was hit by a bus. Most of the buses in Jakarta were operated by the Batak, and the bus had taken over many of the potential *becak* riders who would rather ride a bus with a cheaper fare than ride a *becak* which cost them more. *Becak* drivers only saw that the bus was run by the Batak (as drivers and conductors) and thus the Batak were seen as the ones who took their money — the Batak were their enemy.

These phenomena are also observed in the social relationship between the Chinese and the local Indonesian ethnic groups. As with the interrelationship between ethnic groups of Indonesia, relationships between the Chinese and the local ethnic group do not create conflicts but instead competition for position and resources. This may be accelerated into widespread anti-Chinese conflicts.

As the economic superiority of the Chinese over the Indonesian natives in general is felt and acknowledged by both groups, many Indonesian natives and the Chinese express this in their behavior, which varies in accordance with its context. In areas where the economic superiority of the Chinese dominates the economic activities of that area, in that the

possibility for the economic activities of the local natives is closed compared to those of the Chinese; the potential widespread conflicts of anti-Chinese is great. Examples of this is found in areas such as in West Java and East Java, where several anti-Chinese riots have erupted in this last decade.

In areas such as West Java and East Java the social boundaries between the Chinese and the local natives persist, and inter-group relations are generally defined in terms of formal characteristics. In other areas such as in Central Java, where the possibility of the emerging local native entrepreneurs and businessmen is not closed by the Chinese domination, potential conflicts are limited. Further, there is a tendency to have inter-ethnic relations that are defined more in personal terms.

The existing social boundaries between the Chinese and the local native is in part due to the fact that both groups are aware of their own position and thus can not level with each other in economic terms; with the consequences that the Chinese (especially the young ones) express their superiority (consciously and unconsciously) in symbols that express their wealth, while the majority of the local natives become more aware of their poverty and low status as shown by this exposure.

If marriages between members of different Indonesian ethnic groups are not uncommon now, marriage between the Chinese and the local native is still rare and subject to discussion and gossip by the community. Apparently the social boundary existing between the Indonesian ethnic groups has been weakened by the using of Indonesia as a category for their identity, which is not apparent in the Chinese-local native case.

In some areas such as in Timor, among the Atoni, there is a high frequency of inter-marriage between the Chinese and the local natives but the male is the Chinese and the female is the Atoni, and not the contrary. This is due to the cultural pattern of both cultures in which each gains benefit by such marriage. Even in Central and East Java such marriages do occur, but not if the male is the Javanese and the female is the Chinese. It is because in accordance to the Javanese culture, the "*awu*" (which means the status within the generational order of the Javanese kinship system) of the Chinese is higher or older than the Javanese; in that the wife is in a younger status than the husband, structurally. Thus such a marriage in which the male is the Javanese and the female is the Chinese will upset the existing order in accordance with the Javanese culture.

From my study in Bandung¹⁶ and also as stated by Bruner¹⁷, it is ap-

16 See P. Suparlan, 1972

17 See E.M. Brunner, 1974

parent that children of inter-ethnic marriages do not automatically become Indonesians. They either identify themselves with the mother's or the father's ethnic group or both, as the first level; and then they will call themselves as Indonesians, as the second level of identification. No data is available on the identification process of Chinese-local native children.

CONCLUSIONS

In this paper the interplay of culture and ethnic group as expressed in social interactions or behavior has been discussed at length. Ethnic group has been treated not as a monolithic entity but as a social category for one's identification. The attributes of ethnic identification derive from the ethnic culture, which is seen as an ideational order. Culture among other things, consists of rules and categories for the creation of symbols for communication in social interactions. Behavior as expressed in social interactions is seen as a response to the existing pattern of interactions.

Patterns of interactions are partly defined by the context and motives that the actors encounter. The context of social interactions is most likely defined by the existing structure of power (either ethnic, public, or national cultures) and by social situations. Because ethnic group is seen as a social category and culture is defined as that of the ideational order, the expression of ethnicity which emerges in social interactions is determined by the ability of the concerned actors to interpret and to judge situations and things and to selectively use the available cognitive models of his cultural knowledge to generate his social behavior. Ethnic group and culture is then seen as a set of reference systems which function is to maintaining social order. Actors, however, can also use it to disrupt the existing social order.

Ethnic and cultural differences do not create social conflict, as people do not fight over their differences (as each human being is unique). But competition for position and economic resources may cause them to do so, as ethnicity can be strengthened in order to win at the competition with other groups or ethnic groups. Thus, the policy on ethnic groups should not be used anymore to hinder studies of ethnic groups. Instead, the theoretical framework and the goals of such studies should be judged on their merits whether or not to be granted permission by the government. Further, studies on all areas of this subject should be encouraged by the government for the benefit of the development of social sciences in Indonesia and for the government programs of development.

The first step that should be taken is to ask for information on the respondent's ethnic identity in the census questionnaire. This information is very important as this is the basis for understanding the ethnic com-

position and demographic characteristics of Indonesian society. This, in turn, can be used as one of the variables to study and to analyze the significant roles of ethnic groups and their cultures in fertility and mortality – for the increased success of the national Family Planning Program – and in other government development programs.

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REFLECTIONS ON NON-ALIGNMENT: RELEVANCE, CHALLENGES AND DIMENSIONS

Rasheeduddin KHAN

I

Movements in History have their own momentum and logic as indeed a logic of their momentum.

A retrospective analysis of human history in its broad sweep reveals a certain pattern in development, a clear causality of sequences, a schema of regularities and change and above all a distinct method in the unfolding of man's quest for life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. 'Man makes himself', but in the process of 'making' and in the ever continuing transformation of 'being' into 'becoming' he reveals a rationality that is as vigorous and astounding as it is promising for the ever constant need for building a better society, a better world order.

The rationality of man is manifest not only in the apparent aspects of collective life but more so in its permeation of the vital and complex processes of civilization. Non-alignment movement is a vivid contemporary reflection of this dominant trend in world history.

At the hands of the political analyst and more poignantly in the exercises of the academic tyrò few movements have suffered for their nomenclatural inadequacy as much as Non-alignment has done, almost since its very inception. Maybe there was a flaw in its christening. Pundits of Non-alignment like Jawaharlal Nehru, known for their mild, gentle nature tempered with a sensitivity for serving courageous causes without offending even the detractors or injuring the susceptibilities of the opponents were prepared to avoid undue controversy on name as long as the larger purpose of the movement was served. Diffident about its acceptability among the growing number of the newly emerging states that were still under the semi-colonial economic bondage and fearful of the opposition from the powers that-be, the progenitors of Non-alignment were less bothered about the name in keeping with the Shakespearean adage:

“What is in a name? That which we call a rose, by any other name, would smell as sweet!” They were more concerned about the main line and direction of its growth and wider acceptability. But there was probably another proper reason for the negative connotation, both in name and even in its main impulse. It was consciously meant to be a movement, which in its first phase, was a deliberate negation of negation as part of the dialectics of international power politics; that is a movement that tried to counter the negative development of military-cum-diplomatic alignments presided over by big powers that sought to perpetuate a design of neocolonialism and domination and thereby abridge the autonomy of action of the newly freed countries. It was in this sense that Jawaharlal Nehru, probably as the first exponent of the idea from the de-colonized world, formulated as early as 1946 the rudiments of the non-alignment policy and gave its *raison d’être* when he said:

“We propose, as far as possible to *keep away from the power politics of groups, aligned against one another*, which have led in the past to world wars and which may again lead to disasters on an even vaster scale. We believe that *peace and freedom are indivisible* and the denial of freedom anywhere must endanger freedom elsewhere and lead to conflict and war. We are *particularly interested in the emancipation of colonial and dependent countries and peoples*, and in the recognition in theory and practice of *equal opportunities for all races*.” (Emphasis added).

II

In the intervening thirty years (i.e. 1946 to 1976) from its more or less first articulation, in a cohesive form by Nehru — a man who was not only one of the pioneers of the Non-alignment movement but also the first Foreign Minister of the second most populous land, a hero of one of the world’s most epic freedom struggle and a vibrant advocate of Afro-Asian solidarity and world peace — Non-alignment has passed through various stages of refinement and clarity. From an impulse to an idea, from an idea to a policy and from a policy to a movement, Non-alignment today has become one of the most dominant trends in international relations and politics. By creating a rallying point of convergence of interests and pooling of diplomatic resources for combating common enemies and pursuing common goals Non-alignment has provided a dignity and an autonomous power to the newly liberated countries of the world. In an astounding manner and with telling effect it has propelled the ‘powerless’ of the world as compeers of the most ‘powerful’ in the councils where the destiny of mankind is made. And what is more the ‘powerful’ today tremble before the ‘powerless’ because logic, history, morality and above all the majority of mankind (that was condemned to be the ‘wretched land’ by the bourgeois ‘nobility of the West’ for more than two to three

centuries) is on their side. Therefore, out of pity and kindness of our heart we may as well forgive Daniel Patrick Moynihan, (Professor turned Diplomat and now a latter day political saint) for his agonized outburst at the 'tyrannical majority' in the United Nations, of course in defence of the 'civilized', 'powerless', 'democratic' and 'noble' minority represented by United States and its West European allies!

III

As an impulse and an idea, Non-alignment is rooted in the ethos of world politics that developed as a consequence of the great collapse of the hegemony of the West European imperial system at the end of the Second World War. That War and that great collapse represent a decisive turn in the fortunes of mankind. The dismantling of the global colonial *leviathan* began in 1946 mainly in Asia and then extended in the sixties to Africa and parts of Oceania. Today the process of decolonization is almost over, yet there are vestiges, few but obstinate, particularly in Africa, where the blood of the freedom fighter has still not ceased to flow. With freedom, suddenly the new states were faced with responsibilities and challenges, for which they were ill-equipped. Colonization was no mere exploitation of raw-materials and cheap labour. It was an incubus that destroyed the unity, the resources, the morale, and much that was vital in the heritage of the subject people. It led to degeneration of the masses and enfeeblement of the national spirit. The task of re-building the country, of re-gaining the *elan vital* out of the wreckage of the colonial past was stupendous and formidable. Particularly so because by the mid-fifties the most far-reaching revolution in communication and transport system, active techno-scientific interdependence, emergence of a world market system for basic raw material and commodities, and above all application of nuclear technology to the vastly expanded defence-cum-war structures of the two paramount world powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, had perilously made the world too interdependent and interlinked. Gone were the days when nations and States could be 'built' in comparative isolation, or in voluntary insulation from the conflicts and tensions outside. 'One World' had suddenly descended upon us. And this at a time, when we could not but be 'poor cousins' to our rich 'relatives' — relatives who to be sure were till yesterday those self-invited 'guests' who came to dine and preferred to stay, and made us wash their dishes and sweep the floor while they lorded over us in our own homes! National freedom really meant no more than the withdrawal of the erst-while colonial masters from the political scene. And even that, not quite entirely. The process of de-colonization only began, and not ended with political freedom. For that hard-won freedom to have meaning and rele-

vance in full measure it was imperative to work out a comprehensive national policy covering several relevant fronts, both internal and international, and that too, geared to the strategy of simultaneity of coordinated action in certain sectors of vital concern for the viability of the new state, like political stability, territorial integrity, national unity, social change, economic growth and peace and cooperation particularly with neighbours and generally with the community of nations at large. The options for dealing with these problems, basic as they are, in a piecemeal, sequential and one-by-one approach was obviously not available. Urgency of attending to the many problems of national development at once and simultaneously and the inter-locking and enmeshing of these internal problems with problems of international peace and war, international trade and aid, international political and strategic considerations and ideological battles and global concerns, etc. required of the new nations a skill, foresight and capabilities that were not always available and certainly not in the measure in which they were demanded.

Non-alignment became a framework of foreign policy for countries like India, that were eager to generate national development without getting entangled in the animosities of big powers. As Prime Minister Indira Gandhi has put it, Non-alignment signified the assertion of sovereignty in the conduct of foreign policy.

The mainspring of India's foreign policy ever since the initial stages of its growth under Jawaharlal Nehru has been concern for progressive national reconstruction, for wider Afro-Asian development and solidarity, for regional and international peace, for coalescing the newly-emergent countries on the broad principles of opposing racism, colonialism, for supporting the liberation struggles and for extrication from power-groupings and military blocs. Non-alignment as the framework of foreign policy involved all this and more. It was originally conceived as the assertion of autonomy in the conduct of foreign policy, despite interdependence on other powers for building a viable national economic base. The pursuit of this policy had eventually led to the articulation of objectives of international conduct and relations, resulting in the growth of what has come to be known as the 'third world'.

Much against common impressions, the creation of the 'third world' was not a conscious attempt at such a grouping, but a consequence of the aggregative common action of countries similarly placed in a world that was bipolarised. It was also neither an attempt to be equidistant from the other two worlds of the 'West' and the 'East', nor an effort to isolate from the currents of contemporary political challenges facing the world community. On the contrary, it represented a new style of commitment to the solution of world and regional problems, based on a perspective of the

globe that saw the division between the 'backward' and the 'advanced', the 'agraria' and the 'industria', the 'north' and 'south' more basic and relevant than the division of the world between 'East' and 'West' based on the expediency of power-rivalries of the major-powers and the paramountcy of the Atlantic-cum-European state system to determine the trend and tenor of world politics. The 'third world' has, therefore, been a bridge between the two 'inimical' worlds of the 'West' and the 'East', almost a convergence point of the power blocs. Indeed, it assiduously tried to generate a 'thaw' in the atmosphere of cold-war and bloc-rivalries by attempting to 'defuse' the explosive points of superpower rivalries for general peace, development and prosperity.

It may be recapitulated with some modest pride that the vision of the late Jawaharlal Nehru and the perspective of India's foreign policy have been vindicated by our sustained attempt to remain independent within the complex of international power — equations. What, indeed, was meant by alignment? It meant at least three things: dependence on big-powers, sub-ordination of 'national interests' to the global interests of the power bloc (or rather of the power-pole) and acceptance of an unequal position vis-a-vis the leading powers. Contrary to this patently unequal position, non-alignment represented assertrain of national independence, emphasis on equality of relations based on mutual interests and refusal to pre-empt the nation's right to examine the issues of international politics on their own merit and with reference to national interests. Thus, while alignment was a policy of polarisation, non-alignment was a process of depolarisation of world politics. To be sure non-alignment has never been a substitute for a foreign policy. Indeed, non-alignment has not even been the only framework of our foreign policy, either. But non-alignment has been the dominant framework of our perspectives, has been the main framework of our course of action and the method of maximising national interests.

IV

To perceive the relevance of Non-Alignment in the contemporary epoch, let us quickly survey the stages of major development in international politics in the last three decades.

Since the end of the Second World War in 1945, which more or less coincides with the emergence of India as a sovereign state in 1947 (both the events incidently represent two stages in the decolonisation process consequent on the decline of the Western imperial domination system) international politics has passed through at least four well-defined stages before reaching the current fifth stage in 1971.

The first stage: 1945-1953 was marked by the sudden termination of the war-time alliance between the Western Allies and the Soviet Union resulting in the politics of bloc-formation, arms build-up, counter-subversions and the generation of cold-war.

The second stage: 1953-1959 with the establishment of Soviet-US nuclear parity, the politics of bi-polarity dominated the world scene, resulting in what was called the 'balance of terror'. It was, however, in this phase of intensive bloc-confrontation that a creative break-through was made by India and the Bandung powers to promote an operational policy of coexistence, *Panchasheel*, that became the bedrock of the eventual expansion of the non-aligned powers, constituting the now famous 'third-world'.

The third stage: 1959-1964 witnessed a political setback to the process of friendship and solidarity of the newly emerged sovereignties of Asia and Africa due to the basic shift in China's international outlook and strategy resulting in the Sino-Soviet split and the Sino-Indian conflict. Regional wars in Asia, the rise of autocracies in developing world, the massive liberation of African countries and phenomenal increase in the UN were other factors of consequence.

The fourth stage: 1964-1970 saw the steady growth of schism in the bloc-monoliths, as exemplified by the break between Moscow and Peking, Washington and Paris, and the tussle between Moscow and Warsaw. Prague and Bucharest on the one side and Washington and Bonn and London on the other. The decline of NATO and the rise of the European Community; further consolidation of the Socialist World and the decisive shift in favour of socialism, non-alignment and in defence of the newly independent sovereignties in Asia and Africa provided a new context to international politics.

The current fifth stage, that has begun in 1971, will be remembered for the magnificent process of *detente* generated primarily by Soviet initiative for *rapprochement* with Western Europe and the United States. A clear shifted in the 'United States' perception of its role in world politics in the new context of the change in power-equation was reflected in its diplomatic overtures for normalising relations with China and in responding positively to the prospects of stabilising *detente* and working out a new pattern of relationship with the Soviet Union.

On the collapse of Western-bloc monolith and the diminution in the political and economic supremacy of the United States vis-a-vis the Western World, an event of global significance has taken place which is sometimes ignored or underplayed in this part of the world, but which acquires greater relevancy as we understand the complexity of power

politics. This is the growth of the European community as a dominant power in international affairs, acquiring an international identity of its own. This is only matched on the eastern horizon by the rise of China as a distinct regional power, which is bound to play an increasing world role.

In this framework, a new balance of force has emerged which may be aptly called the '*Pentagonal power pattern*'. This marks a shift from the erstwhile bi-polar politics to politics of multi-polarity of the five-powers, which are no more concerned with problems of an eventual third war or cold war, but are very much concerned with the problem of peaceful settlement of disputes and, indeed, with the wide ramifications of the central problem of *detente*. These five powers include the old two super-powers, the United States, and the Soviet Union, joined by the three new entrants 'United' Europe, China and Japan. The following table would underline their importance on three counts – population, GNP and nuclear armament capability.

TABLE I

THE WORLD'S NEW PENTAGONAL POWER PATTERN (Index Year 1971)

Country	Population (in mn)	GNP (in 1000 million \$)	Nuclear Armaments
1. USA	207	1,050	Over 1,000 ICM
2. USSR	242	550	Over 1,000 ICM
3. W. Europe (9 EEC countries)	255	755	Less than 100 middle range missiles in Britain and France
4. China	773	100	Less than 100 middle range missiles
5. Japan	103	256	No nuclear armament

The dominant feature of the contemporary global situation is undoubtedly *detente*. It is the culmination of the three complementary movements: the steady struggle for world peace; the deliberate policy of the Soviet Union and the socialist World and the concerted efforts of the entire non-aligned Third World countries in which the role of the Republic of India has been second to none. *Detente* from a theoretical angle is not only the expression of the leninist line of co-existence of different social systems within the framework of contemporary international politics, but also the unavoidable result of the impact of the politics of *Panchasheel*, the corner-stone of strategy on non-alignment as advocated by India.

While the general atmosphere of *detente* has considerably defused the points of conflict, particularly in Europe but to be sure, it has not entirely eliminated some lurking doubts and minor irritants. This is so because an accumulation of suspicion covering the life of a whole generation cannot be removed in a single stroke. And further the repercussions of *detente* in Europe and between the Soviet Union and the United States is still to be more carefully worked out for the countries of the Third World.

A concomitant development has been the triumph of the non-aligned developing countries in steadily emancipating themselves from the remnants of colonialism and linkages of dependence on the erstwhile colonial masters. Non-alignment as an operational foreign policy was essentially directed against Western domination. While the rhetoric of non-alignment equated the two superpowers — the United States of America and the Soviet Union — sometimes even mindlessly, but in actual practice and beyond the rhetoric the fact is that non-alignment 'tilted' towards the Soviet Union and the socialist world. Probably the late John Foster Dulles had this implication in his mind when he spoke in anger of non-alignment being immoral. Apparently from the angle of his political morality — the morality of cold war, of containment of communism, of massive retaliation, of brinkmanship, of elaborate method of inducing newly free countries into the web of military alliances etc., — non-alignment could not have appeared as anything different from what he perceived.

V

By the beginning of the seventies the phenomenon of non-alignment as a more or less concerted movement of otherwise disparate political and state entities, has dramatically outpaced the limitation implied in its name. The reality that it covers under its umbrella is phenomenally much wider than the term conveys, or what might have been originally stipulated by the founding-fathers. The negative prefix 'non' does violent injustice to the positive expanse and sweep of the movement at this point of time. The movement has grown by leaps and bounds, geographically encircling the whole globe and demographically representing not only a majority of the world's population, but also the widest cross-section of people otherwise segmented in terms of ethnic backgrounds, societal and cultural variations, a whole range of political choices and ideological nuances and wide disparities in economic and technological levels and psychological make-up.

Further in the very process of making it more relevant some leading non-aligned pioneers like India, Indonesia, Yugoslavia and Egypt (UAR), have entered into bilateral and multilateral agreements, that have not

vitiated but expanded and authenticated the new dimensions of Non-alignment. The Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation of 1971, is a classic example of this development. It is bilateralism based on mutual interests and with recognition of the relevance of non-alignment as specifically mentioned in the Treaty itself. This has belied the impression that non-alignment is a limitation for entering into agreements for peaceful construction and development. For indeed non-alignment provides for 'selective' alignment, and even multilateral alignment that does not tie the non-aligned to any bloc, or to its military grouping.

Today critics of Non-alignment, both well-intentioned and tendentious, have become prisoners of etymological narrowness conveyed by the literal interpretation of the term. By calling it a misnomer they merely quibble with the term and declare it inapt, because it is made to convey more than what was originally intended. Incapable of reconciling the 'term' with the 'phenomenon', they stick to the 'term' and reject the 'phenomenon' in the vain hope that they can wish it away by their mere non-recognition. Therefore, it is an instance of the crises of terminology and an outstanding example of how human movements outgrow terminologies and reflect the continuing gap between the reality of the phenomenon and the inadequacy of terms and concepts. The logic of human action sometimes defies the available human lexicon. So, what is to be done? Improve and expand the human lexicon and not tilt at the windmills of History as a contemporary Don Quixote!

Today, the movement of Non-alignment should really be called the movement of *New Alignment*. While it subsumes the main thrust of non-alignment, but a nodal point has been reached when qualitatively it has become a force much larger, and in its agenda and priorities more positive and different from, its original shape and form. To give it a completely new name might meet with opposition for many reasons. To keep it more or less close to the existing name, both in sound effect and in main connotation, and yet make it render the many dimensions and new challenges, it seems better to merely transform the negative suffix 'non' into the positive suffix 'new', and the nomenclatural metamorphosis is complete! The time has therefore come to change its name by restoring to it the positive designation which its positive content and history demands. In more than one sense it is more an alignment than a non-alignment, a positive affirmation rather than a negative withdrawal, a norm-setter of international politics rather than a deviant from the norm, a challenge rather than a response. It has helped to destroy 'old' alignments based on power, and create 'new' alignment based on peace, progress and prosperity.

For three decades, passing through ups and downs and vicissitudes of international power politics, Non-alignment as a movement had successfully opposed regional and global military alliances, racialism, colonialism and domination, insisted on peace, peaceful co-existence, and peaceful settlement of disputes, worked ceaselessly for disarmament, for positive bilateral and multilateral relations and increase in the volume and components of foreign trade in order to bring in a new international political and an economic order. Non-alignment is indeed a commitment to ennobling and dynamic goals of human betterment shared by a majority of the members of the United Nations. Its negative connotation has been partly eroded by the collapse of bi-polar rigidities and East-West *detente*, but much more so by the vivid positivity that accrues to it by the action-bound programme and clear direction given by the five Summit conferences at Belgrade (1961), Cairo (1964), Lusaka (1970), Algiers (1973), and Colombo (1976).

VI

The validity for calling Non-alignment as New-Alignment is based essentially on the development of the movement from the initial phase (1946-1960) of its opposition to bloc-oriented politics and economy, racism, colonialism, discrimination, domination and aggression to the maturer stage (1961-) of positive initiative for a new political and economic world order based on ten critical and vital concepts for balanced global progress and prosperity, namely, (i) peace; (ii) freedom; (iii) equality; (iv) justice; (v) sovereignty; (vi) security; (vii) trade; (viii) mutuality; (ix) cooperation; and (x) development.

The movement acquired its strength and mandate from the down-trodden of Asia, Africa, Latin America and Oceania who are basically engaged in the process of nation-cum-state building. A certain congruity in the international postures and internal policies of the bulk of the non-aligned is obvious. While much attention has been paid to the external or international postures of the non-aligned, often giving the impression as if it was the be-all and end-all of non-alignment, quite often the internal base on which this international posture was based, was almost ignored if not neglected. Issues and problems of national development are no longer issues exclusively and only of national concern. This is the epoch of 'national-international continuum'. Both the components are integral to the viability of a modern state. The organic link between the two has to be carefully analysed in each specific case.

It should also be analysed as to why, despite varied background and diversified historical experiences and peculiar contemporary socio-

political problems, there is yet a unity of goals and quite often of action, of the otherwise heterogeneous group of the non-aligned. Why the parochial and the national *centrifugal* forces is subordinated to, or reconciled with, the *centripetal* force of cohesion for common goals among the non-aligned? How could this marvellous example of 'unity in diversity' at the international level survive, and more than that acquire strength in the very process of expanding and deepening the common bonds?

The answer to these questions convincingly one has to go to the roots of the causality pattern that determined the expansion and growth of non-alignment movement. In order to do this one might hypothesize that Non-Alignment movement is the product of the convergence of four major currents in the contemporary world situation, namely: (i) the unfolding of the decolonization process involving six-fold major internal developments, viz. political stability, national integration, democratisation, secularization, social change and economic growth; (ii) the unity and solidarity of the anti-colonial, anti-racial and liberation movements involving joint diplomatic and political actions within the United Nations and its many agencies and in other forums of regional and global character; (iii) cooperation and alliance of the anti-colonial, anti-racial forces and liberation movements with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, both for internal development and international goals and concerns; and (iv) the maturation of a new stage of international development consequent on the ever deepening crises of the Europe-based and then Euro-American based world market-system and network of finance-capital sustained by the mechanics of free-enterprise and capitalist mode of production, that had dominated the World economy ever since the Industrial Revolution.

TABLE II

SALES AND ASSETS OF WORLD'S TOP FIFTY MULTINATIONALS (MNC), 1973 (\$ billion)

Country	No. of MNCs	Sales	Assets
U S A	24	234.1	202.2
U K	5	47.0	48.9
West Germany	8	41.5	35.2
Japan	6	33.7	37.1
Italy	3	12.8	17.6
France	2	8.7	7.0
Netherlands	1	8.1	8.6
Switzerland	1	5.2	3.8
Total	50	391.1	360.4

TABLE III

VALUES INDICES EXPORTS FROM DEVELOPED TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, 1971 (Value Indices: 1950 = 100)

From Developed to Developed	774.6
From Developed to Developing	418.8
From Developing to Developed	334.2
From Developing to Developing	270.7

TABLE IV

COMPOSITIONS OF EXPORTS, 1971
(in percentage)

	Manufac- tures	Primary Commodi- ties	Unspecified
1. Developed Market Economy Countries	76	22	2
2. Developing Market Economy Countries	21	78	1
3. Centrally Planned Economy Countries	61	31	8

TABLE V

U.S. DIRECT INVESTMENT FLOWS, 1966-1971 (Approximate in \$ Millions)

	1966	1971
To Developed Countries	3,750	4,800
To Developing Countries	750	1,200

TABLE VI

ESTIMATED TOTAL OIL REVENUE OF ELEVEN OPEC GOVERNMENTS* 1971-1974
(\$ Millions)

1971	—	12,120
1972	—	14,515
1973	—	22,675
1974	—	85,210

* The eleven governments are: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iran, Abu Dhabi, Qatar, Venezuela, Iraq, Algeria, Libya, Nigeria and Indonesia)

TABLE VII

ESTIMATED OIL IMPORT BILL OF SELECTED DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, 1973 & 1974 (\$ Millions)

	1973 (\$ 3.40 per barrel)	1974 (\$ 8.50 per barrel)
Brazil	800	2,000
India	394	964
Phillipines	224	520
Pakistan	110	267
Malaysia	84	201
Senegal	46	106
Peru	45	108
Sri Lanka	45	112
Bangla Desh	37	92
Tanzania	21	53

This new crises of world economy is a result of at least five factors: (1) the inter-penetration of national economies by the Multinational Corporations, whose annual sales in 1973 was of the order of about \$ 400 billion by the foreign subsidiaries, (see Table II); (2) five-fold increase in twenty years, 1950-71, in the volume of world exports and international transactions in terms of its share of total economic activity, and absolute value (that exceeding \$ 300 billion in 1973) with an average annual rate of growth at 10% which is much faster than world income (see Table III and IV); (3) phenomenal growth of international capital flow, ranging from direct investments to shifts of liquid balances (see for instance Table V for US direct investment flow) and also international mobility of labour in Europe and the Mediterranean area; (4) the vigorous impact of international economic relations on national and even on sectoral economic relations; (5) the steep rise in oil prices giving an edge to some of the developing countries who are members of the OPEC (see Table VI) but resulting in energy crises, inflationary condition and economic disequilibrium in the industrially developed countries of Europe and America.

Although it may be noted at this point price-hike in oil is a double-edged weapon, not only because it has strained considerably the already stringent economic situation in the developing and non-aligned countries by eroding their foreign exchange balances and upsetting their national economies (see for instance Table VII), but also because the surplus petrodollars are invested in large measure in the developed countries rather than being available for development, social progress and equitable economic relations in the developing countries.

VII

Precisely because of the convergence of the four main currents in contemporary world situation, Non-alignment movement today has become one of the most dominant trends of our epoch, yet paradoxically due to the expansion in its ranks from a mere 25 at the time of the First Summit in 1961 to 84 for the Fifth Summit at Colombo in August 1976, together with the broadening of national and regional diversities and different scales of priorities of its member-states, not to mention their predilections in foreign policy and patterns of bilateral and multilateral relations, Non-alignment movement is indeed faced with three crises: the *crises of identity*, the *crises of unity* and the *crises of action*.

In bare essentials, the identity of a movement is determined by the interaction of two factors: composition of its membership and collective orientation to common goals. In a movement like Non-alignment which is based on sovereign state entities as its basic unit, spanning the major continents and hemispheres and reflecting obvious differentiations and diversities, the task of compositional homogeneity is both challenging and critical. Challenging, because it demand 'congregation' and not mere 'aggregation' and that too voluntarily a challenge the like of which in terms of scale and magnitude the sovereign state have never before faced in the history of international politics. Critical, because without minimum homogeneity in consonance with common goals, the movement would, as it were, halter and falter. Commonality of goal orientation is a prerequisite both for abiding and operational unity as well as for the validation of the very first purpose of the movement namely a new identity based on rejection of alignment with power-blocs and assertion of the right to form free and equal alliances for development and peace. As a consequence of the increase in membership a fear of amorphousness is expressed that might blur the hard edges of the concept and even retard the dynamism of the movement.

For the maintenance of compositional homogeneity scrupulous adherence to the five-point criteria approved and adopted at the First Summit Conference in Belgrade in 1961, is the safest and the most practical way out. A deviation from this would only increase the number without contributing to the strength of the movement. As time passes, if by qualitative shift in their policy orientation the non-members, particularly from the developing countries, become eligible in terms of the criteria, they should than be welcomed.

The maintenance of identity is really a factor of commitment to common objectives. For this, it is necessary to be clear as to what ought to be *excluded* more than what should be *included*, in the movement of Non-

alignment. Perception should be clear as to who are the foes and who are friends. In the situation of the correlation of forces today, it is imperative to reject the theory and approach of equidistance between what is euphemistically called the West and the East. Can countries and movement maintain equidistance those who support and those who oppose, between those who seek cooperation and those who follow the policy of confrontation, between those forces and countries which objectively come closer to the goals and purpose of non-alignment and those that are basically antagonistic and contrary to them? The policy of equidistance is *not* a genuine part of the non-alignment movement. At best it reflects a fatal hesitancy, a tragic incapacity to differentiate between the negative and the positive forces of History. There is no need here to reiterate the main goals of non-alignment. They are so wellknown. The new identity of the non-aligned will depend on their capacity to build cohesion around these agreed goals. The crises of identity would be averted in the measure in which such a cohesion is built.

To respond effectively to the crises of unity it would be necessary to work out strategies for widening and deepening the expanding areas of unity among the non-aligned. What is the primordial basis for the existing ground level unity between the non-aligned? Obviously shared experiences of the colonial past and shared desire for internal development and international peace. The Non-aligned constitute the fraternity of the poor, the destitute, the illiterate, the diseased, in brief the scum of the ocean of mankind, thanks to systematic exploitation and neglect of the colonial outsiders and the feudal, tribal, propertied strata of the insiders. They enjoy the dubious distinction of being at the lowest level of each of the indicator of socio-economic development, whether it be per capita GNP, life expectancy, literacy, per capita energy consumption, per capita protein consumption, flow of trade, and what have you (see Table VIII to XII). But this 'brotherhood of the wretched' has today risen in revolt against centuries of degradation and deprivation. The majesty of their defiance has already shaken the citadels of power. They are on the offensive against those human causes that were responsible for their misery. They are working out strategies of change. Precisely this trauma of the past and dynamic concerns for the present and the future, joins the non-aligned as joint participants in common endeavours, as brothers in-arms on the long dusty winding road for emancipation from want, fear and domination.

In this glorious participation the non-aligned would not only have to work out new strategies for concerted diplomatic initiatives and action, but also be vigilant against infiltration of their ranks by those who have the propensity to succumb to the powers that-be, against 'overt' and 'covert' designs for subversion and destabilization of legally constituted

regimes, and remain alert to the ever present danger of division and split in the ranks of the non-aligned.

TABLE VIII

CATAGORIES OF COUNTRIES BY SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC INDICATORS OF DEVELOPMENT*, 1971								
	To- tal	North Ame- rica	West Europe	Socia- list countries of Eurp	Asia	Afri- ca	La- tin Ame- rica	Oce- ana
Developed Countries	35	2	19	9	2 ^a	1 ^b	NIL	2 ^c
OPEC Countries	13 ^d	NIL	NIL	NIL	7	4	2	NIL
Poorest Developing Countries	40	NIL	NIL	NIL	16	23	1 ^e	NIL
Other Developing Countries	61	NIL	1 ^f	NIL	16	18	26	NIL

a — Israel & Japan; b — South Africa; c — Australia & New Zealand;

d — Abu Dhabi, Algeria, Ecuador, Gabon, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Venezuela;

e — Haiti; f — Cyprus.

* i.e. (i) Per Capita GNP, (ii) Life expectancy, (iii) Literacy, (iv) Per Capita energy consumption, (v) Total imports. (vi) Total exports, (vii) Net grain trade, (viii) Total reserves.

TABLE IX

PER CAPITA DAILY PROTEIN CONSUMPTION, 1971 (in grams)			
Developed Countries		Developing Countries	
U S	97	India	48
Spain	84	Ghana	43

The crises of action stems generally from the inadequate response of the non-aligned to the challenges of the unfinished revolution in their own countries. For the successful completion of the long delayed and much desired process of change, the non-aligned world will have to work-out interlinking strategies at three levels: national, inter-non-aligned and international.

A whole new wide field of cooperation and pooling of resources in men, money and technology is open to them. The decisions of the 'Group of 77' and the recent meeting of UNCTAD-IV and the action-bound programmes worked out at Lusaka and Algiers call for implementation. As indicated in the tables, the gap between the 'developed' and the 'developing' is wide, and what is worse, is increasing. One has just to look at the wide range of disparities, say for instance in grain consumption,

TABLE X

WORLD GRAIN CONSUMPTION (DIRECT & INDIRECT), 1973
(kilogram per person)

Developed Countries:

— Canada	1,076
— U S	850
— Europe	448
— USSR	724
— Eastern Europe	741
— Japan	275

Developing Countries:

— West Asia	306
— North Africa	216
— China	190
— South East Asia	172
— South America (excluding Brazil and America)	149
— Central Asia	121

TABLE XI

PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT, 1971 (in dollars)

Developed Countries:

U S	5,160
France	3,360
U K	2,430
Israel	2,190

Developing Countries:

Mexico	700
Iran	450
Syria	290
India	110
Ethiopia	80

TABLE XII

ENERGY CONSUMPTION AND POPULATION, 1970
(in percentage)

	Energy Consumption:	Population:
<i>Developed Countries:</i>		
US + Canada + West Europe	57.0	16.2
USSR + Eastern Europe	20.9	9.6
<i>Developing Countries:</i>		
Asia	9.8	53.3
Africa	1.7	9.7
Latin America	4.3	7.8

energy consumption, volume of trade and of course per capita GNP. Table VIII reveals blatantly that *none* of the countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America (with the obvious exclusion of Japan for one reason, and Israel and South Africa for another) are included among the 35 'developed' countries, and conversely none of the North American and European countries are included in the category of 'Poor', not to speak of the 'Poorest'. The irony is that *none* of the 13 OPEC Countries is also qualified to be in the category of the 'developed', not even Venezuela. There is an obvious correlation between the 40 + 61 Poorest and Poor and the 84 members invited to the Colombo Summit of the Non-aligned, whose break-up is 45 from Africa, 29 from Asia, 8 from Latin America and 2 from Europe. In contrast to this Table XIII would indicate the potential wealth of the developing countries in certain major mineral resources.

Indications already exist that blue-prints for expansion and diversification of items of trade; for complementarity of economies: for multiple contacts in the fields of culture, education, science and technology; for pooling of resources, particularly minerals, fuels, food, fertilizers, textile, certain categories of manufactured goods; for pooling of media and information services, etc. have been worked-out. Time has come to give a close look to these proposals and agree on the plan of implementation. The major battle of the Non-Aligned today is not so much political and diplomatic, but developmental and technological. Creative fusion between internal stability and change and international peace and security is a prerequisite in order to move from the level of peaceful co-existence to a higher level of active cooperation among themselves and with countries and states that are not inimical to the goals and purposes of the Non-alignment movement, in order to usher-in the dawn of a more just, equitable and humane world order.

TABLE XIII

SELECTED MINERALS SUPPLIED BY DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, 1972
(as percentage of the world total)

Aluminium Bauxit	88.2
Alumina	46.4
Cobalt	43.0
Copper	37.9
Iron Ore	30.6
Lead	31.7
Manganese	55.5
Sulphur	24.6
Tin	96.5
Tungsten	39.0
Zinc	14.1

THE LURAH (VILLAGE HEAD) AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS

Danny ZACHARIAS

INTRODUCTION

Millions of rupiahs have entered Indonesian villages both in cash and in technology. Through cash it is hoped to develop and rehabilitate the infrastructure and through technology to increase production. The results are evident in the *desas* (villages). We know on newspapers and official speeches about the expansion of the infrastructure in terms of marketing, communication and production and of increased production together with increases in the number of people participating in family planning.

Most of these results can only be achieved through central government support. This Central Government support is based on the idea of creating employment opportunities and additional income for the villagers, through various development programs such as:

- the Kabupaten (Regency) program and the village subsidy and Labour intensive programs, which aim to rehabilitate the infrastructure and create new employment for the villagers.
- the Family Planning program, which aims to improve social welfare.
- the agricultural extension program, which aims to increase agricultural production.

All programs except the Kabupaten program reach the village through the Lurah. This channel was set up by supra-village officials and represents the only channel for development programs coming into the villages. Santosa¹, who along with other writers, has analyzed this system, is inclined to believe the system should be maintained for psychological reasons and because of the lurah's charismatic position. Theodore Smith²

1 Santosa and Hamidjojo, "Mempersiapkan Masyarakat Desa Dalam Menerima Teknologi Baru (suatu pendapat)", disajikan dalam seminar Penerapan Teknologi dalam Pertumbuhan dan Pengembangan Desa, Bandung, Jawa Barat, 1975

2 Theodore Smith, "Pemimpin Desa, Pembaru Pembangunan", *Prisma*, No. 4, tahun ke-II, Agustus LP3ES Jakarta, hal. 29-30

arguing more cautiously, feels that the village head should be used more effectively by policy makers.

It is not the purpose of this article to argue whether the lurah system is right or wrong. It only seeks to describe the consequences of retaining the village head as the sole channel for introducing programs. The analysis will draw on the research findings of the Research Institute of Social Sciences in four villages in the Demak Regency and one village in the Grobogan Regency, Central Java. The research findings indicate that the Lurah not only acts as the head of village government but, what is more, he represents the father figure both for village officials and the village community.

This strong position is further strengthened by the entrance of development programs through the Lurah, who can apparently use his strong position to influence supravillage officials as well.

At the outset this position arose from the nepotic practices of using his position as the sole authority in the appointment of officials for village government. And as a result, the Lurah and his family usually belong to the highest economic class, a position facilitated and strengthened by their role in local development programs, as we shall see.

THE LURAH AND NEPOTISM

Nepotism means using government power to appoint one's own relatives to government positions. The frequent consequence of nepotism is that the official concerned is regarded as a father figure by his subordinates who are his own relatives. The danger is that this practice can transcend and resist government efforts to apply some of the most basic principles of national bureaucracy, such as the proper distribution of power and the establishment of internal control to prevent deviations. The practice of nepotism means that the government is like the organization of a household in which the father, as the family head, makes all the decisions. It means that although there are channels for decision-making at various levels, those channels do not function.

This practice is very noticeable in the five villages studied, as evident in the Lurahs' efforts to appoint their own relatives as officials (see diagram I).

The diagram shows that almost all the officials are related by family ties to the lurah or that the lurah has able to cultivate relationships with almost all the officials. It is obvious that the lurahs first tried to appoint their close relatives, then his distant relatives and finally his close friends

DIAGRAM 1 Number and Inter-Official Family Relationship Centred on The Village Head in The Five Research Villages

Village	Carik (village secretary)	Assistant Village Secretary	Kamituwa (Vice Vil- lage Head)	Bekel (Hamlet Head)	Kebayan (Village Messenger)	Kepingan (Vil. off. who is re- sponsible in the vil. security)	Modin (Religious Official)	Ulu-ulu (off. who is responsible in water ma- nagement)	PTD (Vil. off. who is responsible for agr. ext. work)
Dorolegi	younger bro- ther in law (1) (1) (1 out of 1)	son in law younger bro- ther in law (1) (1) (1 out of 1)	Son (1) (1) (1 out of 1)	Grandchild (1) Younger brother in law, nephew	Son in law (2) Son in law (3) (2 out of 3) indirect (1) nephew (2) (1 out of 2)	— (0) (2)	+	friend (3) (3)	— (0) (1)
Ngelokulon	son in law (1) (1) (1 out of 1)	—	in direct son in law (2) (2 out of 2)	—	indirect son in law (1) (2) (1 out of 2)	indirect re- lative (4) (4)	near friend (2) (2 out of 2)	— (0)	— (0)
Surodadi	son (1) (1) (1 out of 1)	—	step brother (1) (1 out of 1)	—	step brother (2) uncle (3)	—	—	step brother (2) step brother (7)	— (0)
Bogosari	son in law (1) (1) (1 out of 1)	—	son in law (2) (2) (2 out of 2)	indirect great grandson (2) (3) (2 out of 3)	cousin (4) nephew, bro- ther in law, cousin (4)	—	indirect grandson (5) (1)	— (0)	— (0)
Sidorejo	son (1) (1) (1 out of 1)	—	brother in law (1) (1 out of 1)	son (2) far relatives (4)	indirect (2) brother in law, far relative (4)	—	far relative (2) (5) (2 out of 5)	— (1)	— (0)

Note: — = relation

The figure in the second brackets = number of each officials

The figure in the first brackets = number of family relationships

Source: Report of Leadership Section

+ At the moment there is a vacancy for the three modin, one of the candidates is the relative of the lurah of Dorolegi.

to official positions. Because of this method of appointing officials, the lurah is of course regarded as a father figure by those under him. The result is that all decision-making in village government affairs is oriented towards the Lurah. The Lurah thus can arrange government affairs as if he were taking care of his own household. And as mentioned earlier, this practice results in the malfunctioning of rational bureaucratic procedures on programs to be introduced from the supra-village level.

This kind of malfunction is obvious in the failure of the Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Desa (the Village Development Planning Body, abbreviated "Bappensa") two years after it was introduced.

This failure was due in part to the fact that as the villagers' "father", the Lurah regarded himself as being entitled to take decisions without consulting the Bappensa. Even village positions requiring special qualifications (primary education or religious experience), such as the Carik and Modin, were occupied by the Lurah's relatives. For these two official positions the Lurah was only supposed to have a nominating role with regency officials and Department of Religion officers to legalize the appointment. This success in securing these positions for his relatives thus clearly demonstrates the Lurah's ability to form and manipulate his connections with village officials.

In the village of Surodadi, the Lurah is often willing to marry off his son to the daughter of a regency official on condition that the official promises to appoint the Lurah's son as Carik. And both the Carik of Surodadi and the Carik of Sidorejo have in fact acknowledged that they left their school in Semarang because their fathers wanted them to become village cariks. At the same time, the Carik in the village of Dorolegi, who was not a relative of the lurah and was considered to be constantly opposing the lurah's policies, was successfully pressed to resign. This position was then jointly held by the Kamituwa (vice Lurah) and by one of the lurah's close relatives as assistant carik.

The above cases should demonstrate further the lurah's dislike for having official positions occupied by those who are not his relatives. He attains his goal by influencing supra-village officials as well as by putting pressure on other people occupying these positions. In addition to the above cases, the diagram also indicates that in all the research villages except Surodadi, the positions of modin were occupied by the lurah's relatives. In the village of Dorolegi this position is usually occupied by one of the Lurah's brothers, while in the village of Bogosari, the modin is the lurah's cousin; and in Sidorejo two modins are distantly related to the Lurah.

The position of modin in Surodadi is occupied by a person not related to the lurah, although the lurah himself is not greatly interested in religion. With the exception of the village of Mengulon it is assumed that the lurahs in the three other villages belong to the *santri* (pious Moslems). Hence the Lurah automatically wants the position of modin to be occupied by his own relative.

The RISS research in five sample villages in the Jepara regency in 1971 obtained similar evidence.³ This kind of relationship between the lurah and modin occurred frequently at that time, supposedly because those positions required special conditions (education and supra-village approval) that are difficult for the Lurah to arrange. However, the research in 1974 shows that the Lurah is quite capable of establishing this relationship. For positions of kamituwa up to ulu-ulu the lurah has more official authority to appoint his own relatives.

OFFICIAL POSITIONS AND WEALTH

What is it that actually attracts the lurah to establish such a family relationship? In village governments in most areas, particularly in Java, the pamong (official) position has wealth attributes to it, a fact acknowledged by the state regulations and the descriptive law and that has continued since the Dutch period. It will continue as long as local officials are not paid as civil servants.

Obviously this kind of authority is acknowledged by higher officials just as it is by the village community. In state positions wealth is often acquired by misusing authority;⁴ in villages wealth is inherent in the official positions. As soon as a person occupies the position of an official he is given the authority to cultivate bengkok (village land considered as salary).

In the five research villages, as shown in the table, the extent of bengkok for each official is as follows: Lurah 12.8-17.6 ha, carik 6.8-8.5 ha, kamituwa 2.7-4.2 ha, kepetengan 1.4-1.8 ha, PTD 0.7 ha, ulu-ulu 0.3-1.6 ha.

In terms of the composition of the bengkok it is obvious that apart from the lurah, the officials possessing the largest bengkok are the carik

3 Agro-Socio-Economic report in Welahan-Kedung-Semat Areas, RISS, Salatiga, 1971 p. 85-86

4 Ithalaui John (Sociological Aspects of the Foreign Capital Investment in Indonesia), *Cakrawala* Soc. Research Journal, No. IV, November-December, RISS, Salatiga, 1971

TABLE I

TOTAL OFFICIAL LAND AREA (BENGKOK) OF EACH VILLAGE OFFICIAL AND VILLAGE HEAD FAMILY AND THE COMPARISON WITH THE AGRICULTURAL LAND AREA (HECTARE)

Village	Village head	Village secr.	Ass. Vil. secr.	Deputy Vil. head		Hamlet head				Messenger				Kepetengan											
				I		II		I		II		III		IV		V		VI		VII		I		II	
				I	II	I	II	I	II	I	II	I	II	I	II	I	II	I	II	I	II	I	II	I	II
Dorolegi	15.6	7.6	1.5	2.8	—	2.2	2.2	2.7	2.74	2.1	2.1	2.1	2.1	1.6	1.5	—	—	—	—	—	—	1.6	1.5		
Ngelokulon	17.6	8.5	—	3.2	3.5	—	—	—	—	2.5	2.5	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1.6	1.9		
Surodadi	12.8	6.8	—	2.6	—	—	—	—	—	2.3	2.1	1.8	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—		
Bogosari	17.5	8.4	—	4.2	4.2	4.2	4.2	4.2	—	2.8	2.8	2.8	2.8	2.8	2.8	2.8	2.8	2.8	2.8	2.8	—	—	—		
Sidorejo	14	8.4	—	4.2	—	3.5	3.5	3.5	3.5	2.1	2.1	2.1	2.1	2.1	2.4	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—		

Village	Religious Official					PTD	Ulu-Ulu			Total hect-ares	Extent of ricefield dry field (hectare)	Official land as % of total vil-lage area	Official Land Controlled by the village head family			as % of total village area		
													ha	as % of total of-ficial land	as % of total village area			
	I	II	III	IV	V		I	II	III									
Dorolegi	1.4	1.4	—	—	—	0.6	1.6	0.8	0.2	55.8	267	20.9%	40.31	72.2	15.1	15.1		
Ngelokulon	1.7	1.8	—	—	—	—	0.7	0.5	—	45.9	228	20.1%	34.3	74.7	15.0	15.0		
Surodadi	1.4	—	—	—	—	—	0.7	0.3	—	32	181.975	17.9%	27.6	85.0	15.2	15.2		
Bogosari	1.4	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	67.9	350.76	17.4%	51.1	75.3	13.1	13.1		
Sidorejo	2.1	2.1	2.1	2.1	2.1	—	1.1	—	—	62.7	436.818	14.6%	42.0	67.0	9.7	9.7		

and kepetengan; these are the positions that the lurah attempts to fill with his close relatives.

As a result, the largest portion of bengkok is controlled by the lurah's family. From table I it can be deduced that in the five research villages the average bengkok area is 53 hectare of agricultural land or 18% of the total village land. Out of this, 75% is controlled by the lurah and his family (on average 40 ha) whereas the land area controlled by common farmers is only about 0.9 ha.

In the five research villages, the rent for one hectare of rice field is between Rp. 15.000,— and Rp. 35.000,— per season, whereas a dry field ranges from about Rp. 10.000,— to Rp. 20.000,—. If the land is sharecropped, the one releasing it for sharecropping obtains $\frac{2}{3}$ of the yield without contributing to the production (seeds, fertilizer, and labourer's wages). The income obtained by the lurah's family is thus quite substantial if rice fields are rented or sharecropped out. Accordingly, village officials are classified as rich farmers, a group on whom many farmers depend.

These opportunities to obtain income have enabled the lurah's family to enjoy advanced education in large cities. In general in the five research villages, the lurah's families have enjoyed education in Semarang, Kudus, at least up to Senior Secondary School. In four research villages, usually one lurah relative (brother) has graduated as Sarjana Muda (Bachelor: first degree at a University). Therefore, the lurah and carik positions may be continually occupied by the lurah's family, because it is only the lurah's family who has the facility to obtain the required higher education.

In two of the research villages, at the time of the research, the positions of carik and lurah caretaker were unoccupied. The people best able to occupy the positions were the lurah's relatives, because they alone fulfilled the requirement of having higher education. The level of education of the lurah's close relatives, as mentioned above, may be financed by the benefits of occupying bengkok land and further encouraged by the fact that the lurah has occupied his position for 20-30 years.

Besides reaping the benefits of the "tanah bengkok" the lurah's family has been able to establish other businesses of economic value. In the village of Dorolegi, known as a fertile area, there is a huller owned by the lurah's family, while in Bogosari and Sidorejo the sole shop furnished with all sorts of goods for sale is owned by the lurah's children.

This analysis indicates the lurah's very strong economic position together with his social and political advantage. As far as his social position is concerned, the lurah has other social responsibilities due to his po-

sition, such as regulations on marriage, divorce, rituals and the solution of disputes among villagers. These must reach the lurah's attention (as well as that of the *modin*).

In village communities rituals and ceremonies cannot begin until the lurah is present, which indicates that the lurah is regarded as the village patron.

The Lurah's access to political power is made possible not only through the village community, but also through his relationship with village officials. In the village community he increases his influence by financing recreation for the people once a year (on *Independence Day*). The relationship with supra-village officials can have political, social as well as developmental characteristics. This political authority is obtained because he is the sole source of funds for local government activities of a political character.

At the end of August 1974, the Demak regency government performed a "supitan massal" (mass circumcision) as the first step towards the general election of 1977 — especially as an attempt to reach out to Moslems. This could only be carried out with the financial support of the lurah, i.e. the lurahs in each regency each donated Rp. 3.000,—. In non-official activities or the more personal activities of supra-village officials, the lurah has proven to be the financial resource for the Camat (sub-district head) when he holds a feast.

During the period of the research, the lurahs of the sub-district were collectively able to give Rp. 315.000,— to the Camat. This amount given to the sub-district head to finance the cost of a feast to celebrate the circumcision of his children was collected in only one week. The money was collected by the lurahs from those relatives holding official positions in the village.

As a support of social welfare programs coming from the supra-village, the lurah and his family were apparently ready to become the first to accept the family planning program which had entered the research villages in the preceding year. The real purpose of the family planning program was only understood by the lurah and his family, and it can be assumed that in the future the usefulness of this program will only be enjoyed by them.

Before presenting the main theme of this article it is better to look at the organizational aspect of the development program as described below.

THE ORGANIZATIONAL ASPECTS

From the organizational point of view development programs were adequately planned at the level above the desa. The adequacy of this program planning is evident in the involvement of special government agencies of the sub-district level which assisted the Bupati (regent) as the ultimate authority to decide which project would be undertaken. Planning of all physical development from the Kabupaten Program, the village subsidy program and the Labour Intensification program definitely involves the Kabupaten Public Works Service (DPUK) the Irrigation Service (DPUT), and the office of Community Development which assists the Regent in selecting the design and locations of projects. The channelling of each Agricultural Extension Program (Bimas) backed by the Indonesian People's Bank (BRI) has certainly used information provided by the Irrigation and Agricultural Service about the area of wet and dry season Bimas program so that the cash and the infrastructure required could be organized. Of course the area covered by Bimas has probably been reported in a way which shows that it is increasing each year, for this is the foundation of the Bimas package. It is not unlikely that in each sub-district of two Kabupaten (Regencies) visited, one or two units of the Indonesian People's Bank (BRI) have been set up. The BRI village units must channel the Bimas packages. Its employees are Bimas officials and receive a salary from BRI.

The *Kabupaten Program* has been continued each year. The aid had been increased with Rp. 25,— to Rp. 50,— per head per year commencing in 1970, to Rp. 150,— in 1974-1975 and was scheduled to reach Rp. 400,— in 1975-1976. The village aid fund increased from Rp. 100.000,— per desa in 1969 to Rp. 200.000,— in 1974-1975 and was targeted at Rp. 300.000,— in 1975-1976.

The family planning program is becoming continually more aggressive. Each sub-district has one or two field workers for family planning who visit one village each day. These field workers have been well received by the lurah and given food and awards of various kinds for informing the villagers how to insert spirals or explaining about the pill or other family planning methods.

The lurah is the supervisor and his wife the daily chairman. The Labour Intensification program is executed by using the Lurah as a supervisor and the one who finds the manpower. As both the Demak and Grobogan Regencies are considered to be areas threatened by unemployment, the Labour Intensification Program has operated there repeatedly. The Demak Regency, selected as a pilot project for the Labour Intensification Program, began in 1967, then again from 1969 up to the

present. Grobogan Regency, however, only began in 1971/1972. Based on the target of the project, the Department of Manpower decided that the project should seek simple improvements in the infrastructure and also provide employment for farm labourers. They are the people in the desa who always face lack of employment during the dry season. Therefore the Labour Intensification Program has been carried out in August and October when farm labourers can not find sufficient agricultural employment but may be employed in the new projects.

This discussion gives an introductory picture of the development program which has been and is being carried out, as well as of the goals and the organizational aspects of those government agencies above the desa level.

The analysis shows that all programs are decided by supra-village officials and policy-makers at the center. The policy makers receive progress reports from Regency (Kabupaten) officials. Aid will only be given if the projects forms (DIP) have been completed and the preceding year's annual report provided. In general the report consists of: the target of the project, the period of the project and the number of people participating in each project.

But do the reports contain the real facts?

Discussion of hard facts involves evaluating the goal of a program. From the earlier analysis we need to ask who gets the benefits from all these village programs. The writer wants to examine this by looking again at the program's outlets.

THE LURAH AND THE DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS

The discussion of the lurah and his role in local development programs will be limited to programs originating from outside the desa. Several of the programs do not involve the Lurah, such as the Kabupaten subsidy, the Community Health Centres, and the primary schools built according to Presidential Instruction No. X (Inpres X). Programs which do involve the Lurah include *Family Planning*, *Bimas*, *Labour Intensification* and village subsidy. The Family Planning program has already been mentioned above. In practice other programs will likewise primarily benefit the families of the Lurah and other village officials. Let us discuss each project separately.

1. Agricultural Extension Program (Bimas)

The Bimas program is a national program and as a national program it has to be implemented on a national scale. The Agricultural Service

participates in this program as the technical agency, the Indonesian People's Bank (BRI) is the channel for credit and the lurah acts as initiator in the sense of encouraging farmers to use credit. The Information Service also has a role, especially in providing information about the importance of farmers' participation in Bimas. In fact the Bimas program has been welcomed by the farmers in the village. This is because the Bimas "package" (production infrastructure and cash) is provided at low cost.

On the other hand the Bimas Program to increase production will only succeed if there is enough water. The availability of water is a *conditio-sine-qua-non* for new methods of farming, including the use of fertilizers, seed selection and disease eradication, to be carried out intensively. This is evident in the different responses of farmers well irrigated (Dorolegi village) versus poorly irrigated areas (the Ngelokulon village). In well irrigated areas one gets the impression that the rice farming intensification programs (*panca usaha*) have actually been implemented and even that farming methods have been efficiently organized to shorten the time between preparation of the land and harvest.

Before discussing how much Bimas has helped farmers as individuals let us look at the table. (See table 2)

The table shows that only the sample farmers in the Dorolegi village (which is known as a well-irrigated area) were able to use the Bimas package in the dry season. In the rainy seasons people from both well and poorly irrigated areas participated in Bimas. It is interesting to note that in the rainy season all samples with more than 0,5 ha of land from Dorolegi and Surodadi (which is poorly irrigated) participated in the Bimas program, in contrast to the other three villages.⁵

When these figures are related to the goal of the Bimas package, the question arises as to who of the Bimas participants benefited from the package? I ask "Who" because the goal of Bimas is to increase the production of farmers as *individuals* through credit (in the form of cash and production inputs such as chemicals and seed) and not in groups. This aid is considered extremely helpful because the conditions imposed on it are quite lenient, for example an interest rate of 1% with no additional fine if the farmer is forced into arrears. For this purpose in each sub-district (Kecamatan) a village branch of the Indonesia People's Bank (BRI) is set

5 In general it can be concluded that farmers from the lowest stratum (less than 0,5 ha) did not participate in the Bimas program as did other strata. An exceptional village is Bogosari where only sample farmers with more than 5 ha of land participated. In the Ngelokulon (poorly irrigated area), for instance, only 50% of all sample farmers were able to participate.

TABLE 2

BIMAS PARTICIPANTS IN THE FIVE STUDY VILLAGES IN MH 1973-1974 AND MK 1974

Village	Participant per strata MH 1973-1974					MK 1974 total participants per strata						
	I 0,01-0,499 ha	II 0,5-0,999 ha	III 1-1,999 ha	IV 2-4,99 ha	V	Total	I	II	III	IV	V	Total
1. Dorolegi (well irrigated)	9 (17)	4 (4)	5 (5)	4 (4)	5 (5)	27 (35)	3	1	1	2	3	10
2. Ngelokulon (badly irrigated)	5	2	3	2	1	13						
3. Surodadi	(12) 8 (15)	(7) 11 (17)	(5) 3 (3)	(5) 7 (7)	(4) —	(35) 29 (36)						
4. Bogosari	— (13)	— (8)	— (7)	— (5)	2 (2)	2 (35)						
5. Sidorejo	1	3	4	4	3	15						

Note : Figure outside brackets = sample Bimas participants per strata

Source : Figure in brackets = total sample per stratum

: sample interviews

up especially to give credit to farmers. The BRI does not work directly with the farmers but through the lurah and the village officials. According to key informants in the five desa, the lurah first compelled the village officials to take the Bimas packet and then chose Bimas participants from villagers by lottery.

It is clear, therefore, that the lurah and village officials had the first opportunity, while the farmers in the village only came after them. This prevented the village farmers from participating in Bimas. It should be noted that in terms of the structure of land ownership and land control the village officials in the five desa were found in all strata. In general they consisted of lurah and carik in strata IV and V, kamituwa in stratum IV, bekel and kebyan in strata IV, III and II and kepetengan in strata III and II together with modin and ulu-ulu and PTD in strata I and II. The above data show that most of the people who took the Bimas packet were village officials and that they tended to constitute a single group under the influence of the Lurah. Therefore it was usually the same group who benefited from the Bimas program. This phenomenon is even more obvious in Ngelokulon village, where the only participants in the Bimas program from stratum V were the Lurah and the Carik.

Similarly it was mainly the village-official group who become the dry season participants in Bimas in the well-irrigated village of Dorolegi. Thus, the Bimas program which should be constituted so that the farmers can be helped individually was apparently unsuccessful in the five villages studied. This is due to the fact that in the five villages, two groups of farmers had emerged i.e. a group derived from village officials led by the lurah, and the village farmer group. The latter group could only use the Bimas packet on the basis of a lottery, while the village officials could use it as a group under the lurah. This group, because of their position, owned the majority of the land in the desa. And through their participation in Bimas each year, a certain area of rice fields was made available to them as a "Bimas area". Since the Bimas area of the village officials rice fields was added to the rice fields of the villagers who each year received an opportunity to participate, the Bimas area would also increase. This fact would of course please the policy makers who evaluate the Bimas program according to the increase of land area each year. However, as the above analysis shows, the real goal of the Bimas packet has not been attained. Only the village authorities truly benefited from it.

This analysis of the Bimas program gives a picture of development programs which use the lurah as their initiator. In addition there is the problem of hiring out agricultural equipment; for example, a sprayer intended for the use of villagers in Surodadi desa was actually used first by the Lurah and his family.

CONCLUSION

From the above picture, it is clear that before the advent of development programs in the desa, the lurah and his family had become a powerful group: economically, socially and politically. As a result many of the villagers were dependent on them. Their position was further strengthened by the advent of development programs in the desa as their sole entrance was through the lurah. As a result, the benefits of the programs, such as expanded work opportunities for farm labourers and the increase of production for farmers, have been mostly enjoyed by the lurah and his family. On the other hand the supra-village officials may not be fully aware of the need to supervise projects currently in operation to ascertain which villagers have benefited from them. There are at present factors that reduce that supervision. There is some supervision but only administratively, for instance through the examination of the Preliminary Plan and List (DURP) and report. This means there is no direct supervision either before or after the operation of the project. To improve development efforts, government programs should not be the full responsibility of the lurah but should be supervised from outside the village. Such consequences must be taken into consideration if the lurah continues to be the sole entrance of development programs within the village.

CHRONICLES

JANUARY 1979.

Internal Affairs

On January 8, President Soeharto submitted the 1979-1980 Draft State Budget which amounted to Rp. 6.934 billion. The President said on that occasion that the 1979/1980 State Budget has a particular significance since it constitutes part of the long-term development of the nation.

A limited meeting of the Armed Forces' leaders, held in Jakarta on January 9, was attended by the Chiefs of Staff of the respective Army, Navy and Air Force, Chief of Police, Commanders of military academies, the Vice-Commander in Chief and the Head of Bakin (State Intelligence Coordinating Body). Armed Force's Commander in Chief M. Jusuf said that officials concerned with military training and education will get the opportunity to make inspection tours in regions to see how far the results of the training have been applied by the trainees.

Addressing the Working Conference of Informational Coordination throughout Java in Yogyakarta, Information Minister Ali Moertopo said on January 17, that Pancasila should become part of the Indonesian culture, for socializing it only will not suffice. In this regard foreign theories are not applicable in Indonesia.

On January 17, Minister for Industry A.R. Soehoed said in Medan that in facing the industrial development, rationalization in the field of industry is being prepared, because many industrial structures need to be changed and adjusted to the industrial development progress. Between 1990 and 1995, Indonesia will have reached a stage which is called a take off point and there will be no need for new patterns with regard to housing industry that has their own traditional characteristics.

Minister of Culture and Education Daoed Joesoef said at the Fifteenth Anniversary of the State University of Purwokerto on January 29, that at present the management of universities in Indonesia calls for immediate reform. He stated further that the State Universities are lacking in organization, quality, technical know-how, management, administration and that their products are far from satisfactory.

Foreign Affairs

With regard to the current war in Indochina, Information Minister Ali Moertopo said that Vietnamese threats against ASEAN do not constitute a problem for the ASEAN member countries as they adhere to the principle of non-alignment and reliance on their own respective national resilience, so that the domino theory is not applicable here. Meanwhile Foreign Minister Prof. Mochtar Kusumaatmadja said that for the sustenance of peace, stability and development in Southeast Asia, the countries who are involved in the Indochina war should fully respect the U.N. Charter and the Bandung Declaration.

The Third Meeting of ASEAN's Standing Committee was held in Jakarta on January 10, to discuss the results of the 7th. meeting of ASEAN's Economic Ministers previously held in Kuala Lumpur. The meeting decided among other things to accept the working paper of the Secretariat of ASEAN on the draft regulations of ASEAN's Secretariat staff and considered as necessary to form an adhoc committee, that was due to meet in Jakarta on February 1979.

FEBRUARY 1979

Internal Affairs

In his address to editors and PWI (the Association of Indonesian Journalists throughout Indonesia), who participate in the Upgrading of P4 (The Guide to the Living and the Practice of Pancasila) in Jakarta, on February 4, President Soeharto said that the national press should not hesitate to make public all malpractices and irregularities that occurred in society and in the state apparatuses, either in Jakarta or in the regions.

The Armed Forces' Commander in Chief, General Jusuf said to all officers of the IVth. Military Command/Sriwijaya on February 5, that the Armed Forces should not interfere or be concerned with the internal affairs of political parties and Golkar (Functional Group), as to enable them to become mature in their political activities according to their own means and aspirations.

Addressing the Limited Cabinet Session of Economic and Financial Affairs President Soeharto instructed that the inflation rate should be followed and that Bulog (National Logistics Body) should take steps as to monitor the smooth distribution of the nine basic commodities. The government will also take steps against unusual rise of prices by providing

the markets with similar commodities at competitive prices and by opening the possibility of importing them.

Minister of Culture and Education Daoed Joesoef said at a the working session with the Parliament on February 7, that the emphasis of Educational development during the Pelita III (The Third Five Year Development Plan) will be placed on providing learning opportunities to 7-12 year old children and facilities to study at a higher level.

An All-Indonesian Working Conference of Regional Heads (Governors, Regents and Mayors) was held in Jakarta on 19-24 February. President Soeharto said on that occasion that the steps taken to attain development goals should not burden or increase the burden of the people. Each regional head should know, monitor, help safeguard and make efforts for the successful implementation of development in his respective territory.

Minister of Agriculture Sudarsono said at that Conference on February 19, that rice production during the Third Five Year Development Plan will be increased by 3,8%/year, so that in 1983 it will amount to 20,5 million ton. In order to reach the stage of self-support with regard to food, efforts should be made to substitute rice with another similar nutritive and high protein food for the consumption of the people.

The 20th. Plenary Session of the Press was held in Jakarta on 20-23 February, to discuss the function, role and development of the press in Indonesia. The meeting agreed among other things that: (a) in the performance of its role and function, the press should actively participate in development efforts for the success of Pelita III; (b) the press should endorse the socializing of Pedoman Pembinaan Idiil Pers Indonesia (the Guide for the Ideal Development of the Press in Indonesia) and enhance a positive interaction among the press, government and society.

Internal Affairs

The 1st. ASEAN Law Conference was held in Jakarta on February 5-10, to discuss issues on the fostering of justice, the legal profession, legal aid and research, legal documentation and the organization for ASEAN lawyers. They agreed on urging the ASEAN member countries to consider the establishment of an ASEAN standing committee as a means for cooperation in the field of law.

On February 5, Information Minister Ali Moertopo said in Kuala Lumpur, that at present the position of ASEAN is respected and taken into account by all countries, including the PRC and the Sovyet Union, which are continuing their quest for influence in the regions around ASEAN.

The Vth. Meeting of ASEAN Banking Council was held in Bali on February 24. They agreed upon the forming of a special team headed by Dr. J. Panglaykim to make a feasibility study of a Merchant Bank, as the realization of a cooperation of banking among ASEAN member countries.

On February 26 till February 28, the Second ASEAN-MEE Conference on Industrial Cooperation was held in Jakarta, for the promotion of economic and trade relations, and European capital investments in the ASEAN member countries. Both sides agreed on implementing the results of the meeting in Brussels in November 1978.

LATEST PUBLICATION

P-4 and GBHN contains: the Decree of the People's Consultative Assembly of the Republic of Indonesia Number: II/MPR/1978 concerning The Guide to the Living and the Practice of Pancasila (A Single Vow in Fulfillment of the Five-Fold Aspiration), and the Decree Number: IV/MPR/1978 on the Broad Outlines of the State Policy, translated into English and published by *Centre for Strategic and International Studies*, 1st Edition (June 1978), 80 pages, US\$ 1.50/Rp 600,— per copy.

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